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Abstract	
Since	the	creation	of	what	at	the	time	was	called	European	Community,	as	far	as	copy-
right	laws	across	Europe	are	concerned,	there	have	been	acute	differences	across	the	
various	jurisdictions	of	Member	States	and	especially	between	the	common	law	tradi-
tion	of	 the	UK	and	 Ireland	and	 that	of	 the	prevalent	 civil	 law	 in	 continental	 Europe.		
Through	the	years,	these	differences	have	caused	major	problems	in	the	Internal	Mar-
ket	 and	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 trying	 to	 resolve	 them.	 In	 recent	 decades,	 the	 originality	
standard,	which	constitutes	the	only	prerequisite	for	the	protection	of	a	work	by	copy-
right	law,	has	been	further	clarified	and	reached	an	important	extent	of	harmonization	
across	the	Union,	as	far	as	the	subject-matter	covered	by	it	is	concerned	(software,	da-
tabase	 and	 photographs),	 in	 particular	 through	 the	 respective	 Directives	 issued,	 but	
also	 in	 recent	years,	on	 the	basis	of	 several	 judgments	of	 the	Court	of	 Justice	of	 the	
European	Union	 (CJEU),	 including	 Infopaq,	BSA,	Football	Association,	Football	Dataco	
and	Painer.	This	dissertation	attempts	 to	evaluate	 the	contribution	of	 this	 legislation	
and	case	 law	on	 the	harmonization	of	EU	copyright	 law,	 the	 implications	of	 this	har-
monization	on	domestic	laws	of	Member	States	such	as	the	UK,	Germany	and	Greece	
and	what	could	be	further	done,	 in	order	for	a	more	substantial	harmonization	to	be	
achieved,	possibly	through	a	uniform	law	on	copyright,	especially	after	the	entry	into	
force	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 Reform,	which	makes	 an	 EU	 Regulation	 on	 copyright	 law	
seem	more	feasible	than	ever	before.	
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Preface	
Before	you	lies	the	dissertation	“Originality	under	EU	Copyright	Law”	which	was	writ-
ten	as	part	of	the	MA	in	Art,	Law	and	Economy	at	International	Hellenic	University.	
	
The	project	focuses	on	the	criterion	of	the	originality	in	EU	copyright	legislation	and	
the	case	law	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ),	as	a	key	factor	of	the	harmoniza-
tion	 process	 of	 the	 copyright	 legislation	 across	Member	 States	 of	 the	Union	which	
comes	to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	two	different	systems,	those	being	the	civil	and	
common	 law	traditions	existing	 in	 the	union,	which	are	also	analyzed.	 It	provides	a	
thorough	historical	overview	of	this	still	on-going	harmonization	process	while	focus-
ing	and	analyzing	how	it	is	accomplished	through	both	specific	EU	Directives	on	copy-
right	law	and	some	important	decisions	of	the	ECJ	on	the	matter,	the	effects	of	this	
harmonization	on	 the	different	 legal	orders	of	Member	States	and	what	 the	 future	
may	hold	for	EU	copyright	law.			
	
I	would	 like	 to	 thank	my	 supervisor	Dr.	 Irini	 Stamatoudi	 for	 her	 excellent	 guidance	
and	support	during	this	process,	without	whose	cooperation	I	would	not	have	been	
able	to	conduct	this	analysis.	
	
I	hope	you	enjoy	your	reading.	
	
Aikaterini	Pilichou	
Athens,	October	2017	
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1.	Introduction	
The	main	goal	of	this	dissertation	is	to	provide	a	full	analysis	on	the	criterion	of	origi-
nality	of	works	that	can	and	should	be	protected	under	the	EU	copyright	law	and	how	
this	criterion	is	used	by	both	the	Union’s	legislation	and	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	Eu-
ropean	Union	in	an	attempt	towards	a	further	and	more	tight	harmonization	of	copy-
right	 law	across	Member	States	which	 first	 started	at	 the	end	of	 the	1980’s	and	has	
since	then	been	accelerated	and	is	still	ongoing.	Matters,	such	as	the	exact	meaning	of	
originality,	 especially	 that	 of	 its	more	 commonly	 accepted	wording	 as	 the	 ‘’author’s	
own	intellectual	creation’’,	 its	different	dimension	within	the	context	of	the	different	
legal	traditions	 in	the	Union	and	the	scale	and	extent	of	 its	validity	regarding	various	
types	 of	works,	 as	 this	 is	 outlined	 in	 Directives	 91/250/EEC	 (Software	 Directive),	 Di-
rective	 96/9/EC	 (Database	Directive)	 and	Directive	 2006/116/EC	 (Copyright	 Term	Di-
rective,	with	 regard	 to	photographs	 )	as	well	as	 in	milestone	 judgments	of	 the	CJEU,	
such	as	Infopaq,	BSA,	Football	Association,	Football	Dataco	and	Painer1,	are		addressed	
in	this	thesis.		
Another	 important	aspect	of	this	essay	is	to	examine	how	this	harmonized	originality	
standard,	if	it	can	indeed	be	considered	as	such,	has	already	affected	and	will	continue	
to	affect	and	reshape	the	national	jurisdictions	of	specific	Member	States	and	especial-
ly	those	of	the	UK,	which	has	been	affected	the	most,	Greece	and	Germany,	examined	
hereby,	and	if	it	has	or	will	in	the	end	be	able	to	minimize,	if	not	eliminate,	the	differ-
ences	traced	between	the	two	existing	legal	traditions	on	copyright	law	within	the	EU,	
these	being	the	civil	law	tradition	adopted	in	continental	Europe	and	the	common	law	
																																																						
1	 See	 Case	 C-5/08	 Infopaq	 International	 A/S	 v.	 Danske	 Dagblades	 Forening,	 Case	 C-393/09	
Bezpečnostní	 softwarová	 asociace	 –	 Svaz	 softwarové	 ochrany	 v.	Ministerstvo	 kultury,	 Joined	 Cases	 C-
403/08	and	C-429/08	Football	Association	Premier	League	Ltd,	NetMed	Hellas	SA,	Multichoice	Hellas	SA	
v	QC	Leisure,	David	Richardson,	AV	Station	plc,	Malcolm	Chamberlain,	Michael	Madden,	SR	Leisure	Ltd	
Philip	George	Charles	Houghton,	Derek	Owen	and	Karen	Murphy	v	Media	Protection	Services	Ltd,	Case	C-
145/10	 Eva-Maria	 Painer	 v.	 Standard	 VerlagsGmbH,	 Case	 C-604/10	 Football	 Dataco	 Ltd	 v.	 Yahoo!	UK	
Ltd.		
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of	the	UK	and	Ireland,	on	both	of	which	a	historical	overview	and	their	current	status	
will	be	provided	in	the	following	paragraphs.		
Lastly,	specific	conclusions	and	proposals	are	pinpointed,	regarding	the	evolution	and	
future	 track	of	 copyright	 law	 in	 the	European	Union	and	whether	 it	 should	 continue	
being	harmonized	both	vertically	and	horizontally,	 that	 is	 through	Directives	and	 the	
case	law	of	the	ESCJ	respectively,	or	the	EU	should	consider	moving	towards	the	adop-
tion	 of	 a	 common	 Regulation	 on	 copyright	 law	 and	 all	 relating	 rights	 and	 matters.	
Could	the	latter	possibly	prove	to	be	a	more	effective	instrument	and	at	last	unify	cop-
yright	 laws	of	 the	EU	states	by	solving	 the	 issue	of	 territoriality	of	copyright	 law	and	
thus	boost	the	union’s	capacity	to	produce	more	original	works	and	protect	them	bet-
ter	in	today’s	international	field	of	copyright	which	constantly	gets	more	complicated	
and	is	deeply	interconnected	with	the	highly	digitalized	world	that	we	live	in?	The	orig-
inality	standard	and	its	harmonized	adoption	within	the	EU	is	certainly	not	a	panacea	
to	all	 the	current	anomalies	of	copyright	 law	but	 is	on	the	right	track	to	become	the	
most	decisive	factor	to	the	creation	of	a	more	modern,	flexible	and	more	competitive	
common	EU	copyright	law,	able	to	help	Europe	become	the	major	world	player	in	the	
digital	 economy	 which	 nowadays	 provides	 a	 vast	 spectrum	 of	 copyright	 subject-
matter,	as	this	is	already	set	as	one	of	the	main	goals	of	the	Union	in	the	2015	docu-
ment	of	the	European	Commission	with	the	title	“A	digital	Single	Market	strategy	for	
Europe”.2		
2.	The	European	Landscape	before	“Author’s	own	 intellectual	creation”	
doctrine	
Originality	is	undoubtedly	the	cornerstone	of	copyright	law.	Without	originality	there	is	
no	work,	no	creation.	It	is	the	major	tool	that	has	always	been	used	in	order	to	be	as-
sessed	 if	 a	work	 is	worthy	of	 protection	under	 copyright	 law.	Only	works	 that	 show	
																																																						
2	See	A	digital	single	strategy	for	Europe,	COM	(15)	192,	final,	2.4	pp.	6-7.	
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some	minimum	amount	of	 this	attribute	attract	protection3.	Originality,	especially	as	
was	seen	in	the	romantic	age,	corresponds	to	the	independent	creativity	of	the	author	
as	reflected	in	his	or	her	literary	or	artistic	creation	and	makes	his	creation	worthy	of	
protection	by	copyright	law.	Authorship	is	an	important	aspect	of	creativity	and	origi-
nality,	as	it	‘’…	plays	a	fundamental	role	in	terms	of	recognition	and,	as	such	in	deter-
mining	the	scope	of	the	moral	rights	authors	enjoy	in	their	creations’’4.	Though,	as	sig-
nificant	as	it	may	be,	there	is	still	no	clear	and	concrete	definition	of	its	true	meaning	
and	dimension.	Up	until	today,	individual	copyright	laws	have	intentionally	avoided	to	
produce	a	cemented	definition	on	originality,	as	this	task	has	been	undertaken	by	na-
tional	legislatures	and	courts,	with	the	latter	attributing	to	the	concept	a	more	flexible	
definition	 which	 serves	 their	 national	 interests	 best	 and	 suits	 their	 cultures	 better.	
Thus,	 the	 field	of	copyright	 law	 is	and	has	always	been	open	to	new	types	of	works,	
which	need	to	be	protected	by	it	and	do	not	have	to	be	new	or	novel	in	order	to	gain	
that	protection,	as	it	happens	with	inventions	in	patent	law,	where	ideas	and	not	crea-
tive	expression	are	protected.	 It	 is	necessary	 to	be	understood	that	a	work	does	not	
have	to	be	new	to	be	considered	original.	Originality	 is	to	a	great	extent	a	subjective	
concept,	as	it	has	to	do	with	the	personal	contribution	of	the	creator,	his	creative	ex-
pression	and	the	individuality	of	his	work	whereas	the	element	of	the	‘’new’’	is	some-
thing	that	can	be	ascertained	objectively,	by	the	existence	or	not,	of	a	similar	intellec-
tual	creation.	If,	for	example	a	painter	makes	a	portrait	of	a	person	for	the	first	time,	
then	his	work	is	both	new	and	original.	If	later	another	painter	makes	another	portrait	
of	the	same	person,	then	his	work	is	original,	but	not	new.	Both	works	are	protected	as	
original	under	copyright	law.	
We	have	to	pinpoint	that	till	today	the	originality	requirement	as	its	harmonized	inter-
pretation	 of	 ‘the	 author’s	 own	 intellectual	 creation’	 is	 clearly	mentioned	 only	 in	 Di-
rective	 91/250/EEC	 (Software	 Directive)	 and	 its	 later	 codified	 version	 Directive	
2009/24/EC,	Directive	96/9/EC	(Database)	and	Directive	2006/116/EC	(Copyright	Term	
																																																						
3	See	Margoni,	T	2016,	‘The	harmonization	of	EU	copyright	law:	the	originality	standard’,	p.	3.		
4	See	Rosati,	E	2013,	Originality	 in	EU	copyright:	 full	harmonization	through	case	 law,	Edward	
Elgar	Editions,	UK	and	USA,	p.58.	
  -8- 
Directive,	with	 regard	 to	photographs).	 This	 interpretation	of	originality	 tends	 to	be-
come	increasingly	‘popular’	among	courts	and	lawmakers	across	the	EU	and	is	already	
the	quintessential	of	the	legal	harmonization	of	EU	copyright	law.	But	it	has	not	always	
been	like	this.		
A	first	vague	mention	of	the	standard	of	originality	as	a	requirement	for	the	protection	
of	a	work	by	copyright	 law	can	be	found	on	international	 level,	 in	the	Berne	Conven-
tion	for	the	Protection	of	Artistic	and	Literary	works	of	1886,	which	can	be	considered	
to	be	the	oldest	convention	on	copyright	law.	In	Article	2(1),	it	states	that	‘’The	expres-
sion	‘literary	and	artistic	works’	shall	include	every	production	in	the	literary,	scientific	
and	artistic	domain,	whatever	may	be	 the	mode	or	 form	of	 its	expression,…’’.	 It	 then	
uses	the	word	original	in	Article	2(3),	which	states	that	‘’Translations,	adaptations,	ar-
rangements	of	music	and	other	alterations	of	a	 literary	or	artistic	work	 shall	 be	pro-
tected	as	original	works	without	prejudice	to	the	copyright	in	the	original	work’’.	More	
interesting,	as	a	notion	of	originality	is	the	phrasing	of	Article	2(5)	which	stipulates	that		
‘’	Collections	of	literary	or	artistic	works	such	as	encyclopedias	and	anthologies	which,	
by	 reason	 of	 the	 selection	 and	 arrangement	 of	 their	 contents,	 constitute	 intellectual	
creations	shall	be	protected	as	such,	without	prejudice	to	the	copyright	in	each	of	the	
works	forming	part	of	such	collections’’,	a	wording	meaning	that	a	work	protected	by	
the	Berne	Convention	must	be	an	intellectual	creation,	it	must	therefore	bear	originali-
ty.	
On	 the	 level	 of	 the	national	 jurisdictions	 of	 the	Member	 States,	 it	 shall	 be	 said	 that	
there	always	has	been	a	dichotomy	over	the	meaning	and	definition	of	originality,	as	
the	threshold	of	copyright	protection	of	works	 in	these	countries,	and	as	a	result	the	
protection	provided	by	copyright	law	is	of	a	different	grade	and	intended	for	different	
amount	and	type	of	works	and	cultural	creations.	As	already	mentioned	 in	the	 intro-
duction,	there	are	two	main	traditions	on	copyright	law	in	Europe,	each	with	a	differ-
ent	philosophical	background,	as	analyzed	below.	
	
  -9- 
2.1.	The	civil	law	tradition	
The	legal	systems,	which	have	adopted	this	tradition,	including	partially	that	of	Greece,	
have	been	 influenced	by	 the	French	Revolution	and	 the	Enlightenment	and	consider	
the	author,	the	creator	of	the	work,	as	the	center	of	their	subjective	approach.	The	au-
thor’s	works	 are	protected	exactly	because	 they	 come	as	 a	 result	 of	his	 creative	ex-
pression	and	creativity.	In	France,	the	work	needs	to	be	an	oeuvre	d	l’	esprit	5,	a	work	
of	 the	mind	 in	 order	 to	 be	protected	 and	 recognised	by	 the	 law.	 The	 Italian	 law	 re-
quires	that	works	of	ingenuity	must	have	a	creative	character6.	This	droit	d’	auteur	(au-
thor’s	law)	tradition	seems	to	be	really	close	to	the	‘author’s	own	intellectual	creation’,	
as,	 for	 example	 phrases	 like	 ‘persönliche	 geistige	 Schöpfungen’7(personal	 intellectual	
creations),	already	existent	in	Germany	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	and	the	
identical	‘…dass	sie	das	Ergebnis	der	eigenen	geistigen	Shöpfung	ihres	Urhebers	sind8’,	
can	be	found	in	German	Law	of	intellectual	property.	The	main	focus	is	on	the	diptych	
author-work,	with	the	 latter	bearing	a	significant	trace	of	the	author’s	mind	and	per-
sonality,	 his	 personal	 touch.	 An	 author	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	his	work	 and	 vice	
versa.	An	author	must	control	his	works	by	having	rights	on	them,	which	only	belong	to	
him	and	can	never	transfer	all	of	them.	A	strong	influence	of	the	Roman	law	of	domini-
um,	an	absolute	right	over	property	and	the	Cartesian	philosophy,	which	regards	the	
works	of	the	mind	as	superior	to	those	of	the	body,	seem	to	underpin	the	whole	droit	
d’	auteur	system9.	As	much	as	remuneration,	financial	benefits	and	rewards,	as	exclu-
sive	rights,	are	significant	to	copyright	law	and	especially	to	common	law	tradition,	as	
they	are	a	strong	incentive	for	artists	to	produce	cultural	works,	recognition	and	label-
ing	of	the	maker	of	the	work	as	an	independent,	creative	unit,	moral	rights	are	as	well,	
and	at	this	point	is	where	the	meaning	of	authorship	plays	an	important	role	in	the	civil	
law	tradition	and	in	the	general	field	of	copyright.		Someone	in	support	of	this	system	
could	say	that	originality	necessarily	presupposes	that	the	protectable	work	must	de-
																																																						
5	Ibid.,	p.	71.	
6	Ibid.,	p.	72.	See	also	Margoni,	T	2016,	‘The	harmonization	of	EU	copyright	law:	the	originality	
standard’,	p.	6.	
7	Ibid.	7,	p.	72.	
8	Ibid.	7.,	p.	74.	
9	See	Torremans,	P	2007,	Copyright	 law:	a	handbook	of	contemporary	research,	Edward	Elgar	
Editions,	UK	and	USA,	p.21.	
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rive	 from	 the	 personality	 of	 the	 author,	 otherwise,	 even	 scientific	 theories	 and	 re-
search	would	be	protected	by	 intellectual	property	 laws.	But	exactly	because	science	
hunts	the	natural	truth,	something	objectively	observable	by	everyone,	something	that	
is	out	there,	is	not	a	subject	matter	of	copyright	law	and	probably	never	will	be.	Some-
one	could	also	say	that	this	subject-oriented	civil	law	tradition	seems	quite	obsolete	in	
terms	of	the	protection	that	it	can	provide	when	it	comes	to	modern,	more	complicat-
ed,	 technical	mechanically	produced	works,	 e.g.	 databases,	where	 the	personality	of	
the	maker	is	much	harder	to	be	depicted	and	sets	a	high	standard	of	originality	which	
leaves	many	works	unprotected.	On	 this	matter,	 there	will	be	 further	analysis	 in	 the	
following	sections	of	this	dissertation.		
2.2.	The	common	law	tradition	
Copyright	as	a	term,	has	its	roots	in	England	and	Wales	back	in	1556,	when	the	Crown,	
in	its	attempt	to	control	dissemination	of	printed	texts,	due	to	the	boom	of	typography	
experienced	at	the	time,	 introduced	a	registration	system	of	published	works,	whose	
management	was	granted	to	a	London	guild	called	the	Stationer’s	Company.	So,	literal-
ly,	copyright	originally	meant	the	right	to	the	copy	and	not	the	right	to	stop	a	third	par-
ty	 copying	 the	 author’s	 work.	 Decades	 later	 and	 after,	 what	 at	 the	 time	was	 called	
press	–	piracy,	has	taken	huge	dimensions,	 following	the	release	of	 	a	Bill	 for	the	En-
couragement	of	Learning	and	for	Securing	the	Property	of	Copies	of	Books	to	the	Right-
ful	Owners,	the	Statute	of	Anne	passed	into	law	in	1710,	becoming	the	first	copyright	
statute	of	the	modern	world.	It	is	obvious	that	copyright	started	more	as	a	right	of	an	
economic	and	social	dimension	and	perspective,	rather	than	one	with	an	aim	to	pro-
tect	the	natural	rights	of	the	owner.	Of	course,	this	orientation	still	underpins	the	cop-
yright	law	in	the	UK.	Centuries	later,	the	Copyright	Act	of	1911	was	adopted	and	pro-
vided	 for	 the	protection	of	author’s	works	without	 formality.	More	recent	 important	
copyright	acts	in	the	UK	are	the	1956	Act	and	the,	still	in	effect,	Copyright	Designs	and	
Patents	Act	 (CDPA)	 of	 1988.	 The	 latter	 includes	 an	 exhaustive	 categorization	of	 pro-
tectable	works,	when	original,	 such	as	 literary	works,	musical	works,	 drama,	 art	 and	
computer	programs.	A	peculiarity	of	the	UK	copyright	law	is	the	fact	that	copyright	is	
also	granted	to	tapes,	records,	films,	broadcasts,	cable	programs	and	editions	of	books,	
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without	the	prerequisite	of	originality.	At	this	point,	a	distinction	between	the	message	
and	the	medium	can	be	noted,	though	not	officially	stated	in	the	CDPA	and	more	spe-
cifically	in	Section	1	(a),	(b),	(c)	of	the	CDPA	which	stipulates	that:	Copyright	is	a	prop-
erty	right	which	subsists	…	in	the	following	descriptions	of	work	–	(a)	original	literary,	
dramatic,	musical	or	artistic	works	(b)	sound	recordings,	films,	broadcasts	or	cable	pro-
grams,	and	(c)	 the	typographical	arrangement	of	published	editions.	And	this	distinc-
tion	 leads	 to	 a	 further	 requirement	of	 copyright	 protection	 in	 the	UK.	 The	 sufficient	
‘skill,	labour	and	judgment’	which	the	author	has	invested	in	his	work	must	be	record-
ed	in	writing	or	otherwise,	it	must	be	transferred	onto	a	medium	of	expression	in	the	
physical	world.		
The	UK	 copyright	 law	protects	 a	work	 as	 original,	 simply	 based	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
former	 ‘…must	not	be	copied	from	another	work-that	it	should	originate	from	the	au-
thor’	10	and	not	because	it	bears	any	aspect	of	his	personality	or	 individuality,	as	 it	 is	
required	by	the	civil	 law	system,	thus	providing	a	looser	and	somewhat	more	flexible	
originality	standard.	It	suffices,	if	the	creator	made	his	work	by	investing	on	it	his	per-
sonal	labour,	skill,	taste,	knowledge	and	judgment	and	did	not	simply	‘stole’	it	or	cop-
ied	it,	directly	or	 indirectly,	from	someone	else.	The	work	surely	does	not	have	to	be	
‘novel’	 to	 attain	protection.	Moreover,	 this	 personal	 ‘skill	 and	 labour’,	 this	 ‘sweat	of	
the	brow’,	as	it	has	been	characterized,	shall	not	be	extreme	or	out	of	the	ordinary,	but	
just	above	the	minimal,	the	 insubstantial.	UK	Copyright	 law	mainly	provides	the	right	
to	 the	prohibition	of	 copying	of	 a	work.	 Τhe	phrase	 ‘what	 is	worth	 copying	 is	worth	
protecting’11	fully	summarizes	the	view	of	common	copyright	law	on	originality.	Labour	
has	been	at	the	center	of	copyright	protection	in	the	UK	and	not	creativity.	Although,	
in	the	years	prior	to	the	Infopaq	decision	of	the	CJEU,	the	skill,	labour	and	judgment	of	
the	maker	 should	be	 ‘sufficient’	 in	order	 for	him	not	 to	be	 regarded	 that	he	merely	
copies	and	so	causes	an	 infringement	of	the	copyright	 law	and	the	traditional	 ‘’SSJL’’	
(sufficient,	skill,	labour	and	judgment’’)	was	broadly	recognized	by	courts	of	the	coun-
try,	especially	when	it	comes	to	collective	works,	such	as	databases.	This	approach	has	
																																																						
10See	Rosati,	E	2013,	Originality	 in	EU	copyright:	 full	harmonization	through	case	 law,	Edward	
Elgar	Editions,	UK	and	USA,	p.	77.	
11See	Marinos,	M	2004,	Copyright	Law,	2nd	edn,	Sakkoulas	Editions,	Athens	and	Komotini,	p.	76.		
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enabled	the	protection	of	many	more	new	types	of	works	and	creations,	both	creative	
and	just	skill	demanding,	than	the	stricter	continental	droit	d’	auteur	does.	Works	that	
could	otherwise	be	protected	by	laws	of	unfair	competition,	which	are	non-existent	in	
the	UK,	are	protected	by	copyright.	 	 In	the	copyright	law	of	the	common	law	system,	
the	work	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 commodity,	 a	 product,	 as	 something	 only	 of	 economic	 value.	
Whoever	undertakes	the	risk	of	reproduction	and	economic	exploitation	of	the	prod-
uct-creation,	also	has	 the	 right	 to	 receive	 the	economic	benefits	of	 this	exploitation.	
The	producer	and	distributor	is	of	more	interest	to	the	UK	copyright	law	than	the	crea-
tor	of	the	work	and	his	natural	rights	and	this	is	something	easily	concluded	by	the	lack	
of	moral	rights	of	the	creator,	safeguarding	him	against	the	publisher	and	producer	in	
general,	 in	British	 law.	Computer	programs	and	collections	οf	 itineraries	or	meteoro-
logical	facts	on	electronic	databases	are	much	easier	to	be	protected	under	UK	copy-
right	 law.	 Although,	 this	 flexibility	 of	 accepting	 new,	 somewhat	 odd	 products	 under	
copyright	 protection	may	 sometimes	 prove	 problematic	 and	 eroding	 to	 its	 essence,	
especially	in	regard	with	the	typical	creations	of	copyright.	
From	the	above,	it	is	obvious	that	the	differences	between	the	two	existing	systems	of	
copyright	 law	within	 the	 EU	 can	 only	 be	 seen	 as	 fragmenting	 and	 disruptive	 to	 the	
cause	 of	 a	 common	 and	more	 functional	 EU	 copyright	 law.	 Τhere	 is	 the	 need	 for	 a	
common	approximate	originality	standard,	which	transpires	both	the	EU	copyright	leg-
islation	and	the	 jurisprudence	of	the	CJEU,	will	overarch	the	current	divergences	and	
pave	the	way	towards	a	more	harmonized	EU	copyright	law.	
3.	The	criterion	of	originality	in	EU	Copyright	Law	
Since	the	creation	of	the	EU,	previously	known	as	the	European	Economic	Community	
(ECC)	with	the	adoption	of	the	Treaty	of	Rome	in	1957,	copyright	law	was	not	consid-
ered	by	the	primary	ECC	law	as	a	field	in	need	of	regulation,	as	it	then	had	a	more	cul-
tural	 dimension	 rather	 than	 an	 economic	 one.	 For	 decades,	 the	 Berne	 Convention,	
which	all	Member	States	were	then	a	member	of,	seemed	to	be	adequate.	 	Towards	
the	 end	 of	 the	 1980’s,	 the	 political,	 legal	 and	 technological	 landscapes	 were	 ripe	
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enough	for	a	discussion	on	the	reform	of	copyright	laws	across	EU	countries	and	after	
years	 of	 inactivity,	 the	 Green	 Paper	 on	 copyright	 and	 the	 challenge	 of	 technology	
(GPCCT)	 (European	Commission	1988)	was	published.	The	GPCCT	acknowledged	 that	
new	measures	had	to	be	adopted	in	the	field	of	copyright	due	to	the	many	rapid,	soci-
oeconomic	and	technological	changes	that	were	under	way	at	the	time	and	specifically	
in	 the	 context	 of,	 as	 its	 exact	 reading	 stated:	 ‘’	….the	 profound	 changes	which	 have	
been	occurring	in	the	world	economy,	involving	as	they	do	important	structural	adapta-
tions	not	least	in	the	industrialized	countries’’.12	It	continued	by	saying	that:	‘’ In	sum,	
the	 growing	 economic	 importance	 of	 the	 industries	 needing	 copyright	 protection	
against	ready	misappropriation	of	their	products,	particularly	by	copying,	has	naturally	
produced	 pressure	 for	 the	modernization	 of	 existing	 copyright	 protection	 systems	 at	
both	national	and	Community	level’’13.	Despite	the	above,	the	Commission	did	not	re-
ally	 consider	 a	need	of	 an	attenuation	of	 the	disparities	between	 the	national	 copy-
right	laws,	as	a	factor	of	the	proper	functioning	of	the	Internal	Market,	which	was	its	
primary	goal,	especially	 regarding	 the	 traditional	 copyright	 subject	matter,	 as	 it	 stat-
ed:’’	Many	issues	of	copyright	 law,	do	not	need	to	be	subject	of	action	at	Community	
level.	Since	aIl	Member	States	adhere	to	the	Berne	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Lit-
erary	and	Artistic,	Works	and	to	the	Universal	Copyright	Convention,	a	certain	funda-
mental	convergence	of	their	Laws	has	already	been	achieved.	Many	of	the	differences	
that	remain	have	no	significant	impact	on	the	functioning	of	the	internal	market	or	the	
Community’s	 economic	 competitiveness… The	 Community	 approach	 should	 therefore	
be	marked	by	a	need	 to	address	Community	problems.	Any	 temptation	 to	 engage	 in	
law	reform	for	 its	own	sake	should	be	resisted”14.	This	agenda	of	the	Green	Paper	 ig-
nited	renewed	awareness	on	the	matter	and	a	few	years	later	sparked	a	process	of	a	
vertical	 harmonization	during	 the	 1990’s	which	 sought	 to	 regulate	 only	 specific	 sub-
ject-	matter	and	 led	 to	several	Directives,	of	which,	 those	harmonizing	 the	copyright	
protection	of	software,	databases	and	the	term	of	that	protection,	are	examined	here-
by,	always	in	connection	with	the	originality	standard	set	by	them.		
																																																						
12	 See	Green	 Paper	 on	 copyright	 and	 the	 challenge	 of	 technology:	 copyright	 issues	 requiring	
immediate	action,	COM	(88)	172,	final,	1.1.4,	p.	10.	
13	Ibid.,	1.2.5,	p.11.	
14	Ibid.,	1.4.9,	p.	7,	1.4.10,	p.	8.	
  -14- 
3.1.	The	Software	Directive	(91/250/ECC)	
It	was	clear	by	the	orientation	of	the	1988	Green	Paper	mentioned	above	that	it	priori-
tized	to	regulate	the	copyright	protection	of	new	technologies,	as	 it	can	be	read	in	 it	
that:	‘’…the	Commission	concluded	that	a	directive	on	the	legal	protection	of	computer	
programs	is	a	necessary	step	for	the	completion	of	the	internal	market’’	and	that	‘’the	
creation	of	a	European	information	services	market,	currently	divided	by	 juridical	and	
linguistic	 barriers,	 is	 of	 prime	 importance’’15.	 It	 also	 acknowledged	 the	 fact	 that	 in	
some	 countries	 such	 as	 France	 and	 Germany	 further	 requirements	 ought	 to	 be	 ful-
filled,	than	usually	expected	for	other	works,	for	the	protection	of	computer	programs	
and	this	could	harm	the	Internal	Market.16	Thus,	it	came	as	no	surprise,	following	these	
conclusions	(Recitals	3,	4	and	5	 in	the	preamble	of	the	Directive	remain	on	the	same	
spirit)17,	when	in	May	1991,	Directive	91/250/EEC	on	the	legal	protection	of	computer	
programs	was	adopted,	 as	 the	 first	of	 the	 ‘first	 generation’	Directives	of	 the	 vertical	
harmonization	process.	 It	was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	 term	 ‘author’s	 own	 intellectual	
creation’	appeared	in	an	EU	copyright	legal	text	and	this	as	the	only	criterion	of	origi-
nality,	which	should	be	applied,	leaving	no	room	for	other	criteria,	in	compliance	with	
Article	1(3)18.	Furthermore,	in	Recital	8	of	the	Directive,	as	an	additional	safeguard,	it	is	
explicitly	mentioned	that:	 ‘’	Whereas,	 in	respect	of	the	criteria	to	be	applied	 in	deter-
mining	whether	or	not	a	computer	program	is	an	original	work,	no	tests	as	to	the	quali-
tative	or	aesthetic	merits	of	the	program	should	be	applied’’.	At	this	point,	 it	is	worth	
noting	 that,	 despite	 the	 aforementioned	 preclusion	 of	 other	 criteria,	 aiming	 at	 the	
																																																						
15	Ibid.,	5.4.1,	p.180,	6.2.1,	p.207.	
16	Ibid.,	5.6.3,	p.	187.	
17	See	Directive	91/250/EEC	on	the	legal	protection	of	computer	programs,	Recital	3	states	that:	
‘’Whereas	computer	programs	are	playing	an	increasingly	important	role	in	a	broad	range	of	industries	
and	computer	program	technology	can	accordingly	be	considered	as	being	of	 fundamental	 importance	
for	the	Community's	industrial	development;’’,	Recital	4	states	that:	“Whereas	certain	differences	in	the	
legal	protection	of	computer	programs	offered	by	the	laws	of	the	Member	States	have	direct	and	nega-
tive	effects	on	 the	 functioning	of	 the	 common	market	as	 regards	 computer	programs	and	 such	differ-
ences	could	well	become	greater	as	Member	States	introduce	new	legislation	on	this	subject;’’,	Recital	5	
states	 that:	 ‘’Whereas	existing	differences	having	 such	effects	need	 to	be	 removed	and	new	ones	pre-
vented	from	arising,	while	differences	not	adversely	affecting	the	functioning	of	the	common	market	to	a	
substantial	degree	need	not	be	removed	or	prevented	from	arising;’’.	
18	 Ibid.,	Article	1(3)	states	 that:	“A	computer	program	shall	be	protected	 if	 it	 is	original	 in	 the	
sense	that	it	is	the	author's	own	intellectual	creation.	No	other	criteria	shall	be	applied	to	determine	its	
eligibility	for	protection’’.	
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abolishment	of	the	different,	sometimes	extremely	strict	criteria	used	until	then	in	the	
various	Member	States	e.g.	the	‘above	average	creative	effort’	of	the	programmer	 in	
the	 1985	 Inkasso-Programm	 decision	 of	 the	 German	 Federal	 Supreme	 Court	 19,	 this	
new	harmonized	standard	of	originality	for	computer	programs,	entails	itself	a	qualita-
tive	test,	as	it	requires	that	a	work	has	to	possess	a	minimum	degree	of	‘creativity’,	a	
concept	 closely	 related	 to	quality.	 In	 general,	 though,	most	 jurisdictions	do	not	 take	
into	account	the	intrinsic	aesthetic,	artistic	value	or	importance	of	a	work	to	assess	if	it	
is	original	and	protectable	by	copyright.	Law	and	courts	should	not	engage	themselves	
with	this	kind	of	judgments,	which	are	based	unavoidably	on	their	own	personal	stimu-
li,	thus	characterized	by	subjectivity.	Mummery	LJ	held	that	‘	[a]	work	may	be	complete	
rubbish	and	utterly	worthless,	but	copyright	protection	may	be	available	for	it,	just	as	it	
is	 for	 the	 great	masterpieces	 of	 imaginative	 literature,	 art	 and	music.’	 20	 It	 could	 be	
easily	deducted	that	the	application	of	this	common	originality	standard	on	computer	
programs	 seems	 somewhat	 problematic,	 due	 to	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 character	
and	 ‘mechanical’	 form	of	these	works.	The	programmer	uses	of	course	programming	
languages,	 algorithms	 and	 other	 standard	 patterns	 of	 informatics	 but	 has	 a	 relative	
freedom	 of	 creative	 space	 as	well.	 The	way	 he	 chooses	 to	 design	 and	 build	 the	 se-
quences	of	action	steps,	which	the	program	follows	to	reach	the	final	task,	which	it	is	
meant	to	accomplish,	rely	totally	upon	his	skill,	talent	and	creativity.	A	computer	pro-
gram	may	seem	as	a	‘one	piece’	work	to	the	average	user,	but	in	reality	it	consists	of	a	
multitude	 of	 elements	 upon	which	 the	 intellectual	 effort	 of	 the	 creator	 is	 reflected.	
Therefore,	in	practice,	depending	on	the	case	at	hand,	the	courts	are	obliged	to	try	and	
detect	those	elements,	deem	the	whole	work	as	original	and	provide	it	with	copyright	
protection.	The	phrasing	of	the	originality	standard	clearly	reflects	an	attempt	of	com-
bining	elements	of	the	civil	law	and	common	law	traditions,	referred	to	before	in	this	
essay.	 ‘Intellectual	 creation’	 corresponds	 to	 the	 continental	 approach	 whereas	 ‘au-
thor’s	 own’	 to	 that	of	 the	UK	and	 Ireland,	 in	 the	meaning	 that	 the	work	must	 come	
																																																						
19	 See	Green	 Paper	 on	 copyright	 and	 the	 challenge	 of	 technology:	 copyright	 issues	 requiring	
immediate	action,	COM	(88)	172,	final	Green	Paper	5.6.3,	5.6.4,	p.	188.	
20See	Gompel,	SV	&	Lavik,	2013,	‘Quality,	merit,	aesthetics	and	purpose:	an	inquiry	into	EU	cop-
yright	law’s	eschewal	of	other	criteria	than	originality’,	Revue	Internationale	du	Droit	d’	Auteur	(RIDA);	
Amsterdam	Law	School	Research	Paper	no.	2013-51;	Institute	for	Information	Law,	Research	Paper	no.	
2013-03,	pp.	14-15.	
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from	its	author	and	not	someone	else,	 that	 is,	no	to	be	a	copy.	 It	 is	 the	first	 true	at-
tempt,	followed	by	the	other	two	vertically	harmonizing	directives,	of	EU	copyright	leg-
islation	to	find	a	common	ground,	a	fine	balance	between	the	originality	thresholds	set	
by	the	two	systems.	The	final	phrasing	of	the	new	uniform	standard	for	software	was	
based	on	a	previous	term	included	in	the	Directive	87/54/EEC	on	the	legal	protection	of	
topographies	of	semiconductor	products,	which	was	‘creator’s	own	intellectual	effort’.	
The	Green	Paper	of	1988	had	already	proposed	towards	the	adoption	of	a	similar	term	
for	 computer	 programs	but	 the	 final	 term	was	 first	 included	 in	 the	 Initial	 Proposal’s	
Explanatory	Memorandum	and	later	in	the	EC	Amended	Proposal,	before	appearing	in	
the	Directive.21		
As	stated	in	the	2000	EC	Report	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Computer	Program	Di-
rective	 (European	Commission	2000),	 the	new	harmonized	 standard	of	originality	 set	
by	 the	directive	 ‘has	 required	12	Member	 States	 to	 lower	 the	 threshold	 for	 granting	
protection	 and	 the	 remaining	 three	 to	 “lift	 the	 bar”22.	 For	 example,	 Germany	 had	
ceased	 to	 use	 its	 former	 higher	 standard,	 the	 ‘Schöpfungshöhe’,	 literally	 ‘creative	
height’,	while	the	UK	had	not	yet	implemented	the	standard	of	the	Directive	and	this	
was	 something	 that	 could	 prove	 to	 be	 disruptive,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 	 lower	
threshold	 of	 protection	 under	UK	 copyright	 law,	 i.e.	 ‘skill	 and	 labour’	 23.	 Council	 Di-
rective	 91/250/EEC	 (Recital	 6)24	 gives	 copyright	 protection	 to	 computer	 programs	 as	
literary	works	 (whether	written	 in	 source	or	object	 code)	within	 the	meaning	of	 the	
Berne	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Literary	and	Artistic	Works	(Paris	Act,	1971)	(Ar-
ticle	2.1)	25. Article	4	of	the	World	Intellectual	Property	Organization	(WIPO)	Copyright	
																																																						
21	 See	Green	 Paper	 on	 copyright	 and	 the	 challenge	 of	 technology:	 copyright	 issues	 requiring	
immediate	action,	COM	(88)	172,	final,	5.6.24,	p.	196.	
22	See	Report	on	the	implementation	and	effects	of	Directive	91/250/EEC	on	the	legal	protec-
tion	of	computer	programs,	COM	(00)	199,	final,	p.	6.	
23	Ibid.,	pp.	8,	10.	
24See	Directive	91/250/EEC	on	the	legal	protection	of	computer	programs,	Recital	6	states	that:	
‘’Whereas	the	Community's	legal	framework	on	the	protection	of	computer	programs	can	accordingly	in	
the	 first	 instance	be	 limited	 to	establishing	 that	Member	States	 should	accord	protection	 to	 computer	
programs	under	 copyright	 law	as	 literary	works	and,	 further,	 to	 establishing	who	and	what	 should	be	
protected,	the	exclusive	rights	on	which	protected	persons	should	be	able	to	rely	in	order	to	authorize	or	
prohibit	certain	acts	and	for	how	long	the	protection	should	apply;’’.	
25	See	Berne	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Literary	and	Artistic	Works	(Paris	Act,	1971),	Arti-
cle	2.1	states	that:	‘’The	expression	‘literary	and	artistic	works’	shall	include	every	production	in	the	liter-
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Treaty	(WCT)	uses	the	same	formulation	as	the	Directive.	Such	provisions	are	also	on	a	
par	with	Article	10	(1)	of	the	Agreement	on	Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Prop-
erty	Rights	(TRIPs	Agreement)	26.	Lastly,	according	to	the	2000	Report	of	the	Commis-
sion	 on	 the	 implementation	 and	 effects	 of	 this	 Directive,	 its	 implementation	 was	
deemed	as	‘satisfactory’,	its	results	‘favorable’	and	its	effects	‘beneficial’,	with	the	con-
clusion	 that	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 revisit	 its	 substantive	 copyright	 provisions	 at	 that	
time27.	Of	course,	many	years	have	passed	since	then	and	opinions	may	differ	on	the	
correctness	of	the	aforementioned	ascertainments.	
3.2.	The	Database	Directive	(96/9/EC)	
Calling	 for	 ‘investment	 in	all	Member	 States	 in	advanced	 information	processing	 sys-
tems’	and	based	on	the	argument	that	up	until	then,	differences	in	the	legal	protection	
of	databases	in	Member	States	‘have	direct	negative	effects	on	the	functioning	of	the	
internal	market’	 and	 ‘need	 to	 be	 removed’	 and	 that	 ‘such	 unharmonized	 intellectual	
property	 can	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 preventing	 the	 free	 movement	 of	 goods	 or	 services	
within	the	Community’	and	that	‘	databases	are	a	vital	tool	 in	the	development	of	an	
information	market	within	 the	 Community’	 ,	 the	Directive	 on	 the	 legal	 protection	of	
databases	was	adopted	in	199628.	In	line	with	TRIPs	(Art.9)	,	WCT(Art.5)	and	the	Berne	
																																																																																																																																																														
ary,	scientific	and	artistic	domain,	whatever	may	be	the	mode	or	form	of	its	expression,	such	as	books,	
pamphlets	and	other	writings;	 lectures,	addresses,	 sermons	and	other	works	of	 the	 same	nature;	dra-
matic	 or	 dramatico-musical	 works;	 choreographic	 works	 and	 entertainments	 in	 dumb	 show;	 musical	
compositions	with	or	without	words;	cinematographic	works	to	which	are	assimilated	works	expressed	
by	a	process	analogous	to	cinematography;	works	of	drawing,	painting,	architecture,	sculpture,	engrav-
ing	and	lithography;	photographic	works	to	which	are	assimilated	works	expressed	by	a	process	analo-
gous	 to	 photography;	works	 of	 applied	 art;	 illustrations,	maps,	 plans,	 sketches	 and	 three-dimensional	
works	relative	to	geography,	topography,	architecture	or	science’’.	
26	 See	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Trade-Related	 Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	(TRIPs	 Agree-
ment),	Article	10.1	states	that:	’Computer	programs,	whether	in	source	or	object	code,	shall	be	protected	
as	literary	works	under	the	Berne	Convention	(1971)’’.	
27	See	Report	on	the	implementation	and	effects	of	Directive	91/250/EEC	on	the	legal	protec-
tion	of	computer	programs, Brussels,	10.04.2000	COM	(2000)	1999	final,	pp.	20-21.	
28	 DIRECTIVE	 96/91/EC	 on	 the	 legal	 protection	 of	 databases,	 Recital	 2	 states	 that:	 ‘’Whereas	
such	 differences	 in	 the	 legal	 protection	 of	 databases	 offered	 by	 the	 legislation	 of	 the	Member	 States	
have	direct	negative	effects	on	the	functioning	of	the	internal	market	as	regards	databases	and	in	par-
ticular	on	the	 freedom	of	natural	and	 legal	persons	to	provide	on-line	database	goods	and	services	on	
the	basis	of	harmonized	legal	arrangements	throughout	the	Community;	whereas	such	differences	could	
well	 become	more	pronounced	as	Member	 States	 introduce	new	 legislation	 in	 this	 field,	which	 is	 now	
taking	on	an	increasingly	international	dimension;	‘’,	Recital	3	states	that:	‘’Whereas	existing	differences	
distorting	the	functioning	of	the	internal	market	need	to	be	removed	and	new	ones	prevented	from	aris-
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Convention	[Art.2	(5)]29,	the	Directive	does	not	protect	databases	as	 literary	or	other	
type	of	works,	rather	what	it	does	is	to	refer	to	them	as	‘	a	collection	of	independent	
works,	data	or	other	materials	arranged	 in	a	systematic	or	methodical	way	and	 indi-
vidually	accessible	by	electronic	or	other	means’.	 	 In	Article	3(1)	of	 the	Directive,	 it	 is	
made	clear	that	the	requirement	for	protection	is	similar	to	that	already	described	in	
the	Software	Directive,	only	that,	 in	the	case	of	databases,	 it	regards	the	selection	or	
arrangement	(different	than	the	cumulative	‘selection	and	arrangement’	of	the	provi-
sion	of	the	Berne	Convention)	of	their	contents.	In	the	same	article,	as	well	as	in	Recit-
al	16,	it	 is	underlined,	once	again,	that	no	other	criteria,	such	as	‘merit	or	purpose’,	a	
wording	much	broader	than	the	‘qualitative	or	aesthetic	merits	of	the	program’	used	in	
the	 Software	Directive,	 should	be	used	 for	 determining	 the	originality	 of	 a	 database	
and,	as	a	result,	its	eligibility	for	copyright	protection.	An	aesthetic	test	or	other	quali-
tative	evaluation	of	the	database,	regarding	its	worth	or	artistic	dynamic	should	in	no	
case	constitute	an	indicator	of	its	originality.	At	first	glance,	the	application	of	the	har-
monized	originality	 standard	 in	databases	 seems	quite	problematic.	Due	 to	 their	na-
ture,	as	electronic	assortments	of	facts,	like	anthologies	or	encyclopedias	are	in	print,	
they	are	 creations	 that	usually	encapsulate	many	different,	heterogeneous	elements	
and	contents,	which	may	not	attain	the	same	 level	of	originality	or	may	not	even	be	
original.	 To	 further	 clarify,	 the	 originality	 standard	 of	 the	 ‘author’s	 own	 intellectual	
creation’,	as	 it	 is	expresses	verbis	stated	in	Recital	15	of	the	Directive,	 is	applied	only	
on	the	selection	or	the	arrangement	of	the	contents	of	the	database	and	the	granted	
																																																																																																																																																														
ing,	while	differences	not	adversely	affecting	the	functioning	of	the	internal	market	or	the	development	
of	an	information	market	within	the	Community	need	not	be	removed	or	prevented	from	arising;’’,	Re-
cital	4	states	that:	 ‘’Whereas	copyright	protection	for	databases	exists	 in	varying	forms	in	the	Member	
States	 according	 to	 legislation	 or	 case-law,	 and	whereas,	 if	 differences	 in	 legislation	 in	 the	 scope	 and	
conditions	of	 protection	 remain	between	 the	Member	 States,	 such	unharmonized	 intellectual	 property	
rights	can	have	the	effect	of	preventing	the	free	movement	of	goods	or	services	within	the	Community;’’,	
Recital	9	states	that:	‘’Whereas	databases	are	a	vital	tool	in	the	development	of	an	information	market	
within	the	Community;	whereas	this	tool	will	also	be	of	use	in	many	other	fields;’’	and	Recital	10	states	
that:	‘’Whereas	the	exponential	growth,	in	the	Community	and	worldwide,	in	the	amount	of	information	
generated	and	processed	annually	in	all	sectors	of	commerce	and	industry	calls	for	investment	in	all	the	
Member	States	in	advanced	information	processing	systems;’’.	
29	See	Berne	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Literary	and	Artistic	Works	(Paris	Act,	1971),	Arti-
cle	 2	 [5]	 states	 that:	 ‘’Collections	 of	 literary	 or	 artistic	works	 such	 as	 encyclopaedias	 and	 anthologies	
which,	 by	 reason	 of	 the	 selection	 and	 arrangement	 of	 their	 contents,	 constitute	 intellectual	 creations	
shall	be	protected	as	such,	without	prejudice	to	the	copyright	in	each	of	the	works	forming	part	of	such	
collections’’.	
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protection	concerns	only	the	structure	of	the	database	as	the	expression	of	the	idea	of	
the	author	and	not	its	contents	per	se	which	can	be	mere	facts	or	ideas,	not	protected	
by	copyright.	Article	1(2)	stipulates	that:	‘The	protection	shall	not	extend	to	their	con-
tents	and	 shall	 be	without	prejudice	 to	any	 rights	 subsisting	 in	 those	 contents	 them-
selves’.	 In	 databases,	 the	 restricted	 possible	 degree	 of	 creativity	 and	 instinct	 of	 the	
maker	is	detected	on	an	internal	level,	in	the	design,	files,	sub-files,	categories	and	sub-
categories	of	the	collection	and	on	an	external	one,	in	search	tools	e.g.	thesaurus,	di-
rectories	 and	 mediums	 of	 expression	 such	 as	 texts,	 images,	 graphic	 presentations,	
charts	 and	 tables,	 resulting	 from	 the	 creativeness	 of	 the	 author,	 thus	 rendering	 the	
whole	project	original	and	protectable	by	copyright30.	A	reasonable	question	is	wheth-
er	 collections	 of	 scientific	 research	data	 fulfill	 the	 criterion	of	 originality.	Due	 to	 the	
methodical	and	technical	nature	of	science,	 little	room	is	 left	for	subjective	action	on	
the	part	of	the	collector-researcher.	‘…The	author	can	exercise	little	to	no	creativity	or	
originality	in	the	choice,	sequence	and	combination	of	the	data	in	the	collection.	Scien-
tific	databases	are	therefore	in	most	cases	not	likely	to	meet	the	threshold	for	copyright	
protection’31.	An	aspect	of	the	Directive,	worthy	of	our	attention	is	the	double-tier	pro-
tection	 system,	which	was	 introduced	by	 it.	 In	particular,	 in	Article	732,	 the	Directive	
established	a	sui	generis	right,	as	a	form	of	protection	of	those	databases	that	do	not	
fulfill	the	originality	standard,	as	described	above.	This	right	is	a	property	right	and	not	
copyright.	It	is	not	granted	on	the	basis	of	originality	and	can	exist	independently	and	
simultaneously	with	copyright	in	the	same	database,	if	the	necessary	requirements	are	
fulfilled	for	both	forms	of	protection.	According	to	Article	7,	the	object	of	its	protection	
is	‘…	a	substantial	investment	in	either	the	obtaining,	verification	or	presentation	of	the	
contents…’	of	the	database.	Without	this	right,	if	someone	extracted	the	contents	of	a	
database	and	 left	 its	 structure	 (protected	by	copyright)	 intact,	 there	would	be	no	 in-
																																																						
30See	 Synodinou,	 T	 2004,	 The	 legal	 protection	 of	 databases,	 Sakkoulas	 Editions,	 Athens	 and	
Thessaloniki,	pp.	157,	159.	
31See	Guibault,	L	and	Wiebe,	A	2013,	“Safe	to	be	open:	study	on	the	protection	of	research	data	
and	recommendations	for	access	and	usage”,	Universitatsverlag	Gottingen,	2.1,	p.	21.	
32	DIRECTIVE	96/9/EC	on	the	 legal	protection	of	databases,	Article	7.	1.	states	that:	 ‘’Member	
States	shall	provide	for	a	right	for	the	maker	of	a	database	which	shows	that	there	has	been	qualitatively	
and/or	quantitatively	a	substantial	investment	in	either	the	obtaining,	verification	or	presentation	of	the	
contents	to	prevent	extraction	and/or	re-utilization	of	the	whole	or	of	a	substantial	part,	evaluated	quali-
tatively	and/or	quantitatively,	of	the	contents	of	that	database’’.	
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fringement,	which	would	be	against	the	spirit	of	the	law.	It	was	also	a	kind	of	counter-
balance	for	the	UK	and	 Ireland,	where	the	 lower	criterion	of	the	 ‘sweat	of	the	brow’	
seemed	not	to	be	applicable	any	more.33	Lastly,	to	broach	the	impact	of	the	directive’s	
implementation,	according	 to	a	submission	by	 the	European	Association	of	Directory	
and	Database	Publishers	(EADP)	33	there	has	been	“a	significant	increase	in	the	supply	
of	and	information	through	databases	since	the	Directive	was	adopted”34.	 In	this	first	
evaluation	of	 the	Directive,	 it	 is	also	noted	 that:	 ‘…the	harmonized	 level	of	 copyright	
protection	for	“original”	databases	which	has	not	caused	major	problems	so	far’35.	
3.3.	The	Terms	Directive	(2006/116/EC)	
The	 Term	 Directive	 of	 1993	 (Directive	 93/98/EEC)	 was	 the	 second	 one	 adopted	 to-
wards	a	vertical	harmonization	of	the	originality	standard.	 In	2006,	 it	was	codified	by	
Directive	2006/116/EEC,	currently	in	effect,	on	the	term	of	protection	of	copyright	and	
certain	related	rights.	Before	the	adoption	of	the	original	Directive,	it	has	been	noted	
that	 the	minimum	 25-year	 old	 protection	 granted	 to	 photographic	 works	 by	 Article	
7(4)	of	the	Berne	Convention	while	granting	the	rest	of	the	works	50	years	post	mor-
tem	 auctoris	 (pma),	 was	 discriminating	 and	 that	 the	 term	 of	 protection	 in	Member	
States	was	considerable,	with	some	having	a	multiple	protection	system,	e.g.	Germany,	
Spain	and	 Italy.36Recital	17	of	 the	original	Directive	expresses	 the	necessity	of	a	har-
monized	originality	standard	for	photographic	works,	which	due	to	their	artistic	or	pro-
fessional	 character,	 are	of	 importance	within	 the	 internal	market,	 further	promoting	
this	way	the	harmonization	of	the	term	of	protection	in	EU	copyright	 law,	which	was	
the	main	purpose	of	that	legal	initiative37.	It	seems	that	the	harmonization	of	the	origi-
																																																						
33See	 First	 Evaluation	 of	 Directive	 96/9/EC	 on	 the	 legal	 protection	 of	 database,	 Commission	
2005,	Brussels,	2.1,	p.	8.	
34	Ibid,	4.2.3,	p.	18.	
35	Ibid,	6.1,	p.	25.	
36See	Proposal	for	a	Council	Directive	harmonizing	the	term	of	protection	of	copyright	and	cer-
tain	related	rights,	COM	(92)	33,	final	-	SYN	395	Brussels,	23	March	1992,	I.A.8.	p.	7.	
37	See	DIRECTIVE	93/98/EEC	harmonizing	the	term	of	protection	of	copyright	and	certain	relat-
ed	rights,	Recital	17	of	the	preamble	states	that:	‘’Whereas	the	protection	of	photographs	in	the	Mem-
ber	States	is	the	subject	of	varying	regimes;	whereas	in	order	to	achieve	a	sufficient	harmonization	of	the	
term	of	protection	of	photographic	works,	in	particular	of	those	which,	due	to	their	artistic	or	profession-
al	character,	are	of	importance	within	the	internal	market,	it	is	necessary	to	define	the	level	of	originality	
required	in	this	Directive;	whereas	a	photographic	work	within	the	meaning	of	the	Berne	Convention	is	to	
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nality	standard	for	photographs	was	not	the	ultimate	goal	rather	a	side	effect,	an	‘ac-
cident’,	as	it	has	been	pointed	out38.	Part	of	the	phrasing	was,	as	follows:	‘…;	whereas	a	
photographic	 work	 within	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 Berne	 Convention	 is	 to	 be	 considered	
original	if	it	is	the	author's	own	intellectual	creation	reflecting	his	personality,	no	other	
criteria	such	as	merit	or	purpose	being	taken	into	account	the	protection	of	other	pho-
tographs	 should	be	 left	 to	national	 law;	 ‘,	 keeping	 in	 line	with	 the	definition	already	
provided	 in	Article	1(3)	of	 the	Computer	Programs	Directive.	 In	 the	 latest	 text	of	 the	
codified	version,	in	Recital	16,	there	is	no	reference	to	artistic	or	professional	character	
but	is	has	been	established	that	this	omission	does	not	imply	any	change	of	the	origi-
nality	standard	of	‘the	author’s	own	intellectual	creation’.	Although,	the	addition	of	the	
phrase	‘…reflecting	his	personality’	might	be	considered	as	a	toughening	of	the	stand-
ard	 set	 out	 by	 the	 Software	 and	Database	Directives39.	According	 to	Article	 6	of	 the	
codified	version,	photographs,	as	copyrightable	works,	if	meeting	the	originality	stand-
ard,	deserve	 the	 same	 term	protection	of	 life	of	 the	author	plus	 seventy	years	pma,	
granted	 to	 all	 other	works,	 as	 stated	 in	 Article	 1	 of	 the	 same	 Directive.	 It	 also	 pre-
cludes,	as	the	previous	two	Directives	have	done,	as	examined	above,	any	other	crite-
ria,	such	as	merit	or	purpose,	to	determine	the	eligibility	for	protection	and	adds	that	
Member	 States	 may	 provide	 on	 a	 national	 level	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 other	 photo-
graphs,	i.e.	the	non-original	ones,	by	granting	other	related	rights	with	different	terms	
of	protection40.	The	Directive	has	stirred	a	debate	about	 its	effectiveness,	with	some	
cycles	 pointing	out	 that	 instead	of	 enhancing	 legal	 certainty	on	 copyright	 across	 the	
																																																																																																																																																														
be	 considered	original	 if	 it	 is	 the	author's	 own	 intellectual	 creation	 reflecting	his	 personality,	 no	other	
criteria	such	as	merit	or	purpose	being	taken	into	account;	whereas	the	protection	of	other	photographs	
should	be	left	to	national	law;’’	
38	See	Eechoud,	MV	2012,	‘Along	the	road	to	uniformity-diverse	readings	of	the	court	of	justice	
judgments	 on	 copyright”,	 Journal	 of	 Intellectual	 Property,	 Information	 Technology	 and	 E-Commerce	
Law,	vol.	3;	Amsterdam	Law	School	Research	Paper	no.	2012-78;	Institute	for	Information	Law	Research	
Paper	no.	2012-47,	C.13	p.62.	
39	See	Rosati,	E	2013,	Originality	in	EU	copyright:	full	harmonization	through	case	law,	Edward	
Elgar	Editions,	UK	ads	USA,	p.	68.	
40	See	Stamatoudi,	I	&	Torremans,	P	2014,	Commentary	on	the	EU	Copyright	Law,	Edward	Elgar	
Editions,	UK	and	USA,	p.	277.	
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EU,	which	was	one	of	its	primary	goals	(Recitals	4,6,7,21,),	‘it	creates	new	uncertainties	
by	using	vague	and	in	places	almost	unintelligible	language’41.	
4.	The	“horizontal”	judiciary	harmonization	of	the	originality	standard	
Following	 the	 process	 of	 vertical	 harmonization	 of	 the	 originality	 standard	 for	 copy-
right	protection	for	software,	databases	and	photographs,	as	was	analyzed	above,	be-
tween	2009	and	2012,	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union,	with	a	series	of	rul-
ings	 on	 specific	 cases,	 expanded	 the	 application	 of	 the	 originality	 standard	 to	 other	
types	of	works,	apart	from	those	included	in	the	subject	matter	of	the	Directives.	With	
its	 proactive	 role	 and	 its	 sometimes	 dubious	 interpretations,	 it	 has	 contributed	 tre-
mendously	towards	a	more	substantial	widespread	harmonization	of	EU	copyright	law,	
with	 a	 dynamic	 of	 eliminating	 the	 quite	 extensive,	 in	 some	 cases,	 differences	 in	 ap-
proach	of	protection	between	common	 law	and	 civil	 law	countries.	Below,	 follows	a	
thorough	analysis	of	the	most	representative	of	the	CJEU’s	decisions,	which	have	dras-
tically	reshaped	the	landscape	of	EU	copyright	law,	as	far	as	the	originality	standard	is	
concerned.	
4.1.	Infopaq	International	A/S	v.	Danske	Dagblades	Forening	(C-5/08)	
Infopaq	 is	 a	Danish	media	monitoring	and	analysis	business	 that	provides	 customers	
with	 11-word,	 the	 key-word	 plus	 5	 more	 surrounding	 words,	 summaries	 of	 articles	
found	in	Danish	newspapers	and	journals,	on	the	matter	upon	which	the	search	is	re-
quested.	First,	it	digitizes	the	prints,	conducts	the	customized	searches	on	the	collect-
ed	data	and	then	e-mails	the	results	to	the	customers.	The	professional	association	of	
Danish	daily	newspapers	 (Danske	Dagblades	Forening	or	 shortly	DDF)	pointed	out	 to	
Infopaq	that	it	needs	to	first	have	the	authorization	of	the	copyright	owners	to	contin-
ue	its	business	without	infringing	copyright	law.	The	company	answered	by	bringing	an	
																																																						
41 See	Hugenholtz,	B	2000,	“Why	the	copyright	directive	is	unimportant,	and	possibly	inva-lid”,	European	Intellectual	Property	Review	11,	pp.	501-502.	
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action	against	DDF	in	front	of	the	competent	local	court	which,	in	turn,	dismissed	the		
case	and	Infopaq	appealed	the	decision	in	front	of	the	higher	Højesteret.		
The	court	suspended	the	proceeding	and	referred	to	the	CJEU	with	a	preliminary	ques-
tion	on	 the	meaning	of	Articles	2	and	5(1)	of	 the	 Infosoc	Directive42,	with	 respect	 to	
the	reproduction	right	and	the	exemption	for	acts	transient	or	incidental	respectively.	
In	 Recital	 34	 of	 the	 Decision,	 the	 Court	 ruled	 that	 the	 reproduction	 right	 refers	 to	
‘works’,	which	under	Articles	2(5)	and	8	of	the	Berne	Convention,	are	protected	as		‘lit-
erary	and	artistic	‘if	they	‘constitute	intellectual	creations’.	It	then	continued	in	Recital	
35	by	 saying	 that	under	The	Software,	Database	and	Term	Directives,	 the	 respective	
subject-matters	are	protected	by	copyright	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	are	 their	 ‘author’s	
intellectual	 creation’	and	 in	 Recital	 37	 ended	up	 by	 saying	 that	 copyright	within	 the	
meaning	of	the	Infosoc	Directive	is	to	apply	only	in	relation	to	a	subject-matter	which	
is	 original	 under	 the	 originality	 standard	 set	 out	 in	 the	 three	 aforementioned	Direc-
tives.	According	to	this	ruling,	the	same	also	applies	for	parts	of	that	work,	if	they	meet	
the	originality	standard43.	With	this	radical	interpretation,	the	CJEU	concretized	a	shift	
towards	a	fully	harmonized	originality	standard	applicable	to	subject	matter	other	than	
that	of	the	Directives,	which	up	till	 then	had	only	partially	harmonized	the	originality	
criterion.		With	a	single	decision,	the	Court	took	a	huge	leap	towards	a	full	harmoniza-
tion	that	policy	papers	and	legislation	had	not	done	for	so	many	years.	It	underlined	in	
Recital	44	that	newspaper	articles	are	protected	as	literary	works	within	the	context	of	
the	 Infosoc	Directive	and	 that	originality	 corresponds	 to	 ‘…their	 form,	 the	manner	 in	
which	they	are	presented	and	their	 linguistic	 form’	and	 in	recital	45	states	that	these	
works	consist	of	words	‘…only	through	the	choice,	sequence	and	combination’	of	which	
the	author	comes	to	an	 intellectual	creation.	 It	has	been	viewed	that	this	cumulative	
prerequisite	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 stem	 from	 international	 law	 on	 which	 the	 decision	
claims	to	be	based	but	more	on	German	law.44	It	concludes	that	the	11-word	summar-
ies	made	by	 Infopaq	 are	 protected	by	 the	provisions	 of	 Infosoc	Directive	 if	 they	 are	
																																																						
42	Directive	2001/29/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	22	May	2001	on	the	
harmonization	of	certain	aspects	of	copyright	and	related	rights	in	the	information	society.	
43		Case	C-5/08	Infopaq	International	A/S	v.	Danske	Dagblades	Forening	[38].		
44	See	Vousden,	S	2010,	‘Infopaq	and	the	europeanisation	of	copyright	law’,	The	WIPO	Journal,	
vol.	1,	issue	2,	197,	pp.	202-203.	
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themselves	an	expression	of	the	author’s	 intellectual	creation45,	 thus	confirming	that	
the	 originality	 standard	 is	more	 qualitative	 than	 quantitative	 and	 therefore	 national	
courts	should	not	hold	that	copying	of	small	extracts	and	passages	is	de	minimis	and	so	
not	infringing	copyright46.	
4.2.	 Bezpečnostní	 softwarová	 asociace	 –	 Svaz	 softwarové	 ochrany	 v.	 Ministerstvo	
kultury	(C-393/09)	
In	2001,	Bezpečnostní	softwarová	asociace	(BSA),	a	security	software	association,	ap-
plied	to	the	Czech	Ministry	of	Culture	(Ministerstvo	kultury	–	MK)	for	an	authorization	
to	 collect	 copyright	 in	 computer	 programs	 and	 in	 particular	 graphic	 user	 interfaces	
(GUI).	 The	MK	 denied	 such	 an	 authorization	 and	 after	 years	 of	 proceedings	 before	
court	and	the	MK,	the	latter	rejected	the	application	of	BSA.	After	a	first	failed	appeal,	
the	BSA	appealed	again	before	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court	of	the	Czech	Repub-
lic,	the	Nejvyšší	správní	soud,	which	deemed	a	preliminary	ruling	as	necessary	and	re-
ferred	two	questions	to	the	CJEU.		
The	question	of	 interest	 to	 this	essay	was	whether	GUIs	 fall	within	 the	 scope	of	 the	
phrase	‘the	expression	in	any	form	of	a	computer	program’	 in	Article	1(2)	of	Directive	
91/250	(the	“Software	Directive”).	The	Court	ruled	that	the	source	code	and	the	object	
code,	as	forms	of	expression	of	the	computer	program	are	entitled	to	be	protected	by	
copyright	as	a	computer	program	by	this	Directive	and	this	because,	as	such	forms	of	
expression,	 they	 permit	 the	 reproduction	 in	 different	 computer	 languages47.	 It	 then	
continued	by	saying	that	‘“…the	[GUI]	does	not	enable	the	reproduction	of	the	comput-
er	 program	 itself,	 but	merely	 constitutes	 one	 element	 of	 that	 program	 by	means	 of	
which	users	make	use	of	the	features	of	that	program”	and	thus,	 is	not	protected	by	
copyright	by	virtue	of	the	provisions	of	the	Software	Directive48.	But	the	Court	did	not	
																																																						
45	Case	C-5/08	Infopaq	International	A/S	v.	Danske	Dagblades	Forening	[47].	
46	See	Griffiths,	J	2011,	“Infopaq,	BSA	and	the	“Europeanisation”	of	United	Kingdom	copyright	
law’,	Media	&	Arts	Law	Review,	vol.	16,	p.3.	
47	Case	C-393/09	Bezpečnostní	softwarová	asociace	–	Svaz	softwarové	ochrany	v.	Ministerstvo	
kultury	[34],	[35].	
48	Ibid.	[41],	[42].	
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stop	there	and	astonishingly	continued	and	said	that	a	graphic	user	interface	can,	as	a	
work,	be	protected	by	copyright	if	it	is	its	author’s	intellectual	creation,	under	Directive	
2001/29	(Infosoc	Directive)49.	It	also	broached	the	criteria	applicable	for	the	considera-
tion	of	the	eligibility	of	the	GUI	as	original50.	Moreover,	it	goes	a	step	further	down	the	
road	than	where	it	was	with	Infopaq.	If	the	phrasing	of	Recital	4651	is	read	in	a	specific	
way,	then,	 it	seems	that	the	Court	recognizes	the	‘author’s	own	intellectual	creation’	
as	the	one	and	only	indicator	and	prerequisite,	in	order	for	a	specific	subject-matter	to	
be	attributed	with	the	character	of	copyright	work52.	If	it	is	creative,	it	is	copyright	ma-
terial.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	the	Court	has	left	no	doubts	about	the	harmonization	of	
the	originality	standard,	already	started	by	Infopaq.		
4.3.	Football	Association	Premier	League	Ltd	v.	QC	Leisure	and	Karen	Murphy	v.	Me-
dia	Protection	Services	Ltd	(C-403/08	&	C-429/08)	
The	Football	Association	Premier	League	(FAPL),	as	the	major	football	league	competi-
tion	in	England,	has	obtained	broadcasting	rights	of	the	matches	and	has	granted	ex-
clusive	licenses	to	various	broadcasters	who	were	obliged	to	broadcast	only	on	a	terri-
torial,	i.e.	national	basis	and	use	encryption	on	the	live	transmissions	to	prevent	third,	
unauthorized	 parties,	 out	 of	 the	 licensed	 territorial	 basis,	 from	 receiving	 the	 live	
broadcast	of	the	football	matches,	available	only	to	those	subscribers	who	had	the	re-
quired	decoding	apparatus.	In	the	joined	cases	under	examination,	the	FAPL	and	oth-
ers	 commenced	proceedings	against	 suppliers	of	decoding	equipment	who	 sold	 it	 to	
owners	of	pubs	 (Karen	Murphy)	and	other	public	houses	who	used	 foreign	decoding	
devices	to	screen	live	football	matches	which	were	received	by	foreign	broadcasters.	In	
particular,	Murphy	after	 losing	her	 first	 appeal	before	 the	 competent	 court,	brought	
the	case	before	the	High	Court	of	Justice	of	England	and	Wales,	which	referred	ques-
tions	to	the	CJEU.	It	did	the	same	with	similar	questions	in	case	C-429/08.		
																																																						
49	Ibid.	[46],[51].	
50	Ibid.	[48],[49],[50].	
51	Ibid.	[46].	Recital	46	states	that:	‘’Consequently,	the	graphic	user	interface	can,	as	a	work,	be	
protected	by	copyright	if	it	is	its	author’s	own	intellectual	creation’’.	
52	See Griffiths,	J	2011,	“Infopaq,	BSA	and	the	“Europeanisation”	of	United	Kingdom	copyright	
law’,	Media	&	Arts	Law	Review,	vol.	16,	p.8.	
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Under	our	work	perspective,	it	is	of	importance	that	the	Court,	for	determining	if	the	
national	legislation	at	issue	justifiably	provided	FAPL	the	right	for	territorial	exclusivity	
in	broadcasting	and	 if	 this	 is	 tantamount	 to	a	 restriction	 to	provide	services,	 first	as-
sessed	if	football	matches	themselves	can	be	protected	by	copyright.	It	said	that	foot-
ball	matches	cannot	be	classified	as	 ‘works’,	added	that	 to	be	classified	as	such,	 ‘the	
subject-matter	would	have	to	be	original	in	the	sense	that	it	is	the	author’s	own	intel-
lectual	creation’	and	concluded	that	sporting	events	cannot	be	regarded	as	intellectual	
creations	classifiable	as	works	within	the	meaning	of	the	Copyright	Directive’,	this	ap-
plicable	to	football	matches	which	‘…	are	subject	to	rules	of	the	game,	leaving	no	room	
for	creative	freedom	for	the	purposes	of	copyright’.	53If	our	interpretation	is	right,	the	
Court,	 as	 in	BSA,	 surpasses	 the	 lines	which	already	drew	 in	 Infopaq	and	equates	 the	
terms	‘work’	and	‘original’,	in	the	sense	that	a	subject-matter	is	a	copyright	work	when	
and	if	it	is	original,	creative.	This	view	seems	to	differentiate	from	the	definitions	pro-
vided	by	Articles	2(1)	and	(2)	of	the	Berne	Convention,	by	which	it	is	reasoned	that	an	
intellectual	creation	constitutes	a	work	for	copyright	law	if	it	is	‘a	production	in	the	lit-
erary,	scientific	and	artistic	domain’	and	belongs	to	one	of	the	categories	of	works,	de-
scribed	in	the	Treaty,	thus,	its	originality	is	determined	at	a	second	stage54.	Lastly,	the	
phrase	 ‘creative	freedom’	used	by	the	CJEU,	seems	to	associate	originality	with	a	de-
gree	 of	 perceptiveness	 and	 is	 similar	 to	 phrases	 in	 European	 case	 law,	 such	 as	 the	
French	‘reflet	de	la	personnalité	de	l'auteur’	or	‘empreinte	personelle’55.		
4.4.	Eva-Maria	Painer	v.	Standard	VerlagsGmbH	(C-145/10)	
In	the	case	at	hand,	Painer,	an	Austrian	freelance	photographer	had	taken	many	por-
trait	photographs	of	Natascha	Kampusch,	when	the	 latter	was	still	at	nursery	school.	
Years	later	the	girl	was	abducted	and	police	authorities	used	those	same	photographs	
in	 their	 searches.	Many	 newspapers	 and	magazines	 also	 published	 the	 photographs	
																																																						
53	See	 Joined	Cases	C-403/08	and	C-429/08	Football	Association	Premier	League	Ltd,	NetMed	
Hellas	SA,	Multichoice	Hellas	SA	v	QC	Leisure,	David	Richardson,	AV	Station	plc,	Malcolm	Chamberlain,	
Michael	Madden,	SR	Leisure	Ltd	Philip	George	Charles	Houghton,	Derek	Owen	and	Karen	Murphy	v	Me-
dia	Protection	Services	Ltd,	[96],	[97],	[98].	
54	See	Rosati,	E	2013,	Originality	in	EU	copyright	law:	full	harmonization	through	case	law,	Ed-
ward	Elgar	Editions,	UK	and	USA,	p.138.	
55Ibid.,	p.139.	
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without	permission	and	without	giving	credit	to	the	photographer.	Some	of	them	had	
even	released	the	portraits	as	Photofits,	after	processing	them,	to	depict	the	possible	
image	that	the	girl	supposed	to	have	at	the	time,	as	years	had	passed	since	her	disap-
pearance.	After	the	girl	was	found,	the	photographer	brought	the	publications	before	
the	 competent	national	 courts,	which	even	 though,	 determined	 that	 the	defendants	
did	 not	 need	 Painer’	 s	 consent	 to	 publish	 the	 photo-fit	 version	 of	 her	 photographs,	
they	still	referred	their	questions	to	the	CJEU	for	a	preliminary	ruling	on	several	mat-
ters.		
In	particular,	in	regard	with	the	limitations	for	quotations	and	for	use	in	the	interest	of	
public	 security,	 provisioned	 in	 Articles	 5	 (3)	 d	 and	 (e)	 of	 the	 InfoSoc	 Directive	 and	
whether,	under	the	meaning	of	Articles	1(1)	and	5(5)	of	the	InfoSoc	Directive	and	arti-
cle	12	of	the	Berne	Convention,	‘‘photographic	works	and/or	photographs,	particularly	
portrait	photos,	are	afforded	‘weaker’	copyright	protection	at	all	adaptations	because,	
in	view	of	their	 ‘realistic’	 image,	the	degree	of	formative	freedom	is	too	minor’56’.	On	
answering	this,	the	Court	referred	to	Infopaq	and	said	that	protection	under	Article	6	
of	the	Term	Directive	refers	to	photographs,	only	if	they	are	their	‘author’s	own	intel-
lectual	creation’	and	continued	by	saying	that	this	happens	when	they	‘reflect	the	au-
thor’s	personality’	and	‘the	author	was	able	to	express	his	creative	abilities	in	the	pro-
duction	of	 the	work	by	making	 free	and	creative	choices’57.	These	choices,	which	 the	
Court	indicatively	states	in	the	decision,	permit	the	author	to	stamp	his	creation	with	
his	’personal	touch’58.	This	phrasing	of	the	Court	is	clearly	more	similar	to	its	interpre-
tation	of	originality	in	Murphy	rather	than	that	in	Infopaq	and	Bezpečnostní	softwarová	
asociace	and	can	be	read	as	an	a	contrario	argument,	in	connection	with	Football	As-
sociation	59.	Yet,	again,	in	this	case,	it	seems	that	the	European	originality	standard	is	
more	in	line	with	the	continental	system,	which	puts	emphasis	on	the	author’s	person-
ality.	The	European	originality	standard	seems	to	be	more	of	a	qualitative	nature,	as	
explained	above	in	our	analysis.	The	Court	concludes	that	a	portrait	photograph	is	pro-
																																																						
56	See	Case	C-145/10	Eva-Maria	Painer	v.	Standard	VerlagsGmbH,	[85],[86].	
57	Ibid.,	[87],[88,[89].	
58	Ibid.,	[91],[92].	
59	See	Rosati,	E	2013,	Originality	in	EU	copyright	law:	full	harmonization	through	case	law,	Ed-
ward	Elgar	Editions,	UK	and	USA,	p.	153.	See	also	Ibid.	56,	[89].	
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tectable	to	the	extent	enjoyed	by	other	works	and	that	such	extent	should	not	depend	
‘…	on	possible	differences	in	the	degree	of	creative	freedom	in	the	production	of	vari-
ous	categories	of	works’60.	
4.5.	Football	Dataco	Ltd	v.	Yahoo!	UK	Ltd	(C-604/10)	
Football	Dataco	and	 the	other	 applicants	 create	 lists	of	 all	 the	 fixtures	 to	 take	place	
within	a	year	in	the	English	and	Scottish	football	leagues.	Yahoo!	and	the	other	oppos-
ing	parties,	used	those	lists	in	their	respective	fields	of	activity,	e.g.	news/information,	
betting	etc.	 The	Court	 of	Appeal	 of	 England	and	Wales	held	proceedings	 and	with	 a	
reference	 to	 the	CJEU	asked	 for	a	preliminary	 ruling	on	whether	 football	 fixtures	 fall	
within	 the	 scope	of	 protection	 provided	under	Article	 3	 of	 the	Database	Directive61.	
The	Court	underlined	that	the	protection	granted	by	this	article	regards	the	‘structure’	
of	a	database	and	not	its	‘contents’,	as	confirmed	by	Recital	15	in	the	preamble	of	the	
Directive,	and	 that	 under	Article	 10(2)	 of	 TRIPs	 and	Article	 5	 of	 the	WIPO	Copyright	
Treaty,	compilations	of	data	are	protected	as	copyright	if	‘…	by	reason	of	the	selection	
and	 arrangement	 of	 their	 contents	 constitute	 intellectual	 creations’,	 that	 ‘protection	
does	 not	 extend	 to	 the	 data	 and	 is	without	 prejudice	 to	 any	 copyright	 subsisting	 for	
that	data’	and	has	nothing	to	do	with	‘the	creation	of	the	data	contained	in	the	data-
base’.	62	It	then	notices	that,	while	setting	up	a	database,	originality,	as	the	only	appli-
cable	criterion63,	exists	only	when	 the	author,	 in	 the	way	 that	he	selects	or	arranges	
the	data,	‘’expresses	his	creative	ability	….by	making	free	and	creative	choices	and	thus	
																																																						
60	Ibid.	56,	[94,	[97],[98],[99].	
	61See	Directive	96191EC	on	the	 legal	protection	of	databases,	Article	3	states	 that:	 ‘’1.	 In	ac-
cordance	with	this	Directive,	databases,	which,	by	reason	of	the	selection	or	arrangement	of	their	con-
tents,	constitute	the	author’s,	own	intellectual	creation	shall	be	protected	as	such	by	copyright.	No	other	
criteria	shall	be	applied	to	determine	their	eligibility	 for	 that	protection,	2.	The	copyright	protection	of	
databases	provided	for	by	this	Directive	shall	not	extend	to	their	contents	and	shall	be	without	prejudice	
to	any	rights	subsisting	in	those	contents	themselves’’.	
62	 See	Case	C-640/10	 Football	Dataco	 Ltd	 v.	 Yahoo!	UK	 Ltd,	 [30],	 [31],	 [32].	 Recital	 15	of	 the	
Software	Directive	states	that:	 ‘’Whereas	the	criteria	used	to	determine	whether	a	database	should	be	
protected	by	copyright	should	be	defined	to	the	fact	that	the	selection	or	the	arrangement	of	the	con-
tents	of	the	database	is	the	author's	own	intellectual	creation;	whereas	such	protection	should	cover	the	
structure	of	the	database’’.	
63	 Ibid,	 [37,	 [40].	Article	16	of	the	Database	Directive	states	that:	 ‘’Whereas	no	criterion	other	
than	originality	in	the	sense	of	the	author's	intellectual	creation	should	be	applied	to	determine	the	eligi-
bility	of	the	database	for	copyright	protection,	and	in	particular	no	aesthetic	or	qualitative	criteria	should	
be	applied;’’	
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stamps	his	‘personal	touch’	’’64.	This	criterion	of	originality,	though,	is	not	met,	if	during	
the	setting	up	of	the	database,	due	to	 ‘technical	considerations,	 rules	or	constraints’,	
there	is	no	room	left	for	the	‘creative	freedom’	of	the	author	to	be	expressed65.	At	this	
point,	 the	 Court	 made	 clear	 analogies	 to	 its	 definitions	 of	 originality	 in	 Infopaq,	
Bezpečnostní	 softwarová	 asociace,	 Football	 Association	 and	 more	 clearly	 to	 that	 of	
Painer.	 It	 then	concluded	that	 the	skill	and	 labour	of	 the	author	of	creating	 the	data	
and	the	significant	 labour	and	skill	 that	came	 into	setting	up	the	database	can,	 in	no	
case,	justify	its	protection	by	copyright	under	the	Software	Directive66	and	that	it	is	of	
no	 relevance	whether	 the	 selection	or	 arrangement	of	 the	data	 (e.g.	 date,	 time	and	
identity	of	teams	for	football	fixtures)	‘adds	important	significance’	to	that	data67.	For	
example,	the	economic	value	of	the	data	 is	 irrelevant	 in	determining	 infringement	of	
copyright68.	Again,	the	harmonized	originality	standard	is	the	only	applicable.	
Shortly	summarizing	the	rulings	examined	above,	it	can	be	said	that	‘’free	and	creative	
choices’’	are	at	the	center	of	the	originality	standard	for	all	works.	The	‘personal	touch’	
of	the	author	derives	from	his	choices	and	arrangements	and	renders	his	works	origi-
nal	and	thus,	protectable	by	copyright.	The	harmonized	originality	standard	is	far	more	
subjective	than	it	is	objective.	
	
5.	Selective	 issues	on	 the	 impact	of	 the	ECJ	 case	 law	on	Member	State	
domestic	laws	
It	is	easily	conducted	from	the	above	that	in	recent	years,	the	CJEU	with	its	controver-
sial	rulings	has	proven	itself	as	the	major	driving	force	towards	the	establishment	of	a	
truly	harmonized	originality	standard	in	EU	copyright	law.	This	‘harmonization	bug’	of	
the	Court	 has	 led	 to	 a	 ‘harmonization	by	 stealth’,	 as	 it	 has	 been	described	by	 some	
																																																						
64	Ibid.,	[38].	
65	Ibid.,	[39].	
66	Ibid.,	[42],[46].	
67	Ibid.,	[35],	[41].	
68	See	Davison,	MJ	&	Hugenholtz,	PB	2005,	“Football	fixtures,	horse	races	and	spin-offs:	the	ECJ	
domesticates	the	database	right”,	European	Intellectual	Property	Review,	no.3,	p.1.	
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commentators,	casting	doubts	over	its	competence	to	stick	to	this	proactive	stance.69	
However,	 it	 is	 sure	 that	 the	effects	of	 the	Court’s	 rulings	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘author’s	
own	intellectual	creation’	originality	standard	on	the	national	 level	of	Member	States	
have	 been	multiple	 and	 of	 a	 different	 severity,	 depending	 on	 the	 tradition,	 that	 of	
common	or	 civil	 law,	 that	up	 till	now	was	prevalent	 in	 those	 jurisprudences.	 For	 the	
purposes	of	this	dissertation,	we	will	focus	on	the	impact	of	the	CJEU’s	case	law	in	na-
tional	laws	of	the	UK,	Germany	and	Greece,	as	this	is	currently	unfolding.	
It	is	more	than	obvious	that	the	traditional	UK	originality	standard	of	‘skill,	labour	and	
judgement’	cannot	be	applied	anymore.	The	CJEU	has	made	 it	 clear	 that	even	 if	 this	
labour	is	sufficient	and	important,	it	is	of	no	relevance.	Only	free	and	creative	choices	
are	 required.	 The	 previous	 lower	 threshold	 that	 protected	 almost	 all	 works,	 if	 they	
were	just	not	copied	and	were	the	result	of	a	minimum	labour	is	raised	and	will	protect	
a	 lot	 fewer	works	by	copyright	 from	now	on.	 In	practice,	 though,	British	courts	have	
not	 fully	adopted	the	new	criterion	and	they	either	deem	it	as	right	or	reject	 it	or	 in	
some	cases	 they	have	actually	blended	the	old	and	the	new	one	 in	 their	decisions.70	
For	instance,	in	the	case	of	Allen	v	Redshaw,	the	competent	court	had	completely	ig-
nored	not	only	the	CJEU’s	decisions	but	also	the	European	criterion	on	the	concept	of	
originality	in	general,	since	it	stated	that:	“…The	test	for	originality	of	artistic	works	is	
low	and	it	is	clear	to	me	that	Mr	Allen	created	original	works	for	the	show	and	all	the	
associated	posters	etc...”.71	Furthermore,	 in	the	case	of	NLA	v	Meltwater,	the	respec-
tive	judge72	of	the	High	Court	recognized	the	European	originality	criterion,	as	shaped	
																																																						
69	See	Derclaye,	E	2014,	“Assessing	the	impact	of	the	reception	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	Eu-
ropean	Union	case	law	on	UK	copyright	law:	what	does	the	future	hold?,	Revue	Internationale	du	Droit	
d’auteur,	2014	(240),	p.	2.	See	also,	Griffiths,	J	2013,	“Dematerialization,	Pragmatism	and	the	European	
Copyright	Revolution”,	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	33(4); Queen	Mary	School	of	Law	Legal	Studies	
Research	Paper	No.	156/2013,	C.1,	p.	18.		
70Ibid.,	p.	18.	
71	 See	 Ian	Richard	Allen	v	Robert	Redshaw	 [2013]	EWHC	1312.	 See	also	Paul	Gregory	Allen	v	
Bloomsbury	Publishing	Plc	and	Joanne	Kathleen	Murray	[2010]	EWHC	2560,	whether	Harry	Potter	books	
infringed	the	copyright	in	the	book	Willy	the	Wizard.	See	also	Suzy	Taylor	v	Alison	Maguire	[2013]	EWHC	
3804	in	which	Clarke	J	states	at	par.	8	that:	“For	an	artistic	work	to	be	original	 it	must	have	been	pro-
duced	as	the	result	of	independent	skill	and	labour	by	the	artist.	The	greater	the	level	of	originality	in	the	
work	 the	higher	 the	effective	 level	of	protection	 is,	 because	 it	 is	 the	originality	which	 is	 the	 subject	of	
copyright	protection”.	However,	by	this	ruling	both	Infopaq	and	Painer	are	being	breached.	
72	 See	Future	Publishing	v	Edge	 Interactive	Media	 [2011]	EWHC	1489,	where	 the	 same	 judge	
does	not	even	cite	the	Infopaq	case.		
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by	Infopaq	and	applied	it	in	the	case,	whereas,	after	an	appeal	on	the	same	case,	the	
Chancellor	 of	 the	High	 Court	 simply	 dismissed	 the	 criterion	 set	 by	 Infopaq	 and	 only	
considered	the	criterion	of	originality,	as	formed	by	British	jurisprudence	to	formulate	
his	decision73.	Following	a	different	approach,	that	somewhat	alters	the	criterion	of	the	
author’s	 own	 intellectual	 creation,	 Floyd	 J,	 in	 Football	Dataco	 v	Britten	Pool,	 has	 re-
garded	that	a	database	is	protected	under	copyright	law,	as	being	the	result	of	not	just	
labour	but	 that	of	 ‘’judgement,	 skill	 and	discretion’’74.	 To	him,	 football	 fixtures	are	a	
product	of	skill	as	well75.	Lastly,	some	decisions	of	the	High	Court	have	stated	both	the	
British	SSJL	and	the	European	originality	criterion,	without	clearly	indicating	any	differ-
ence	or	specifying	a	possible	common	ground	between	the	two,	thus	 igniting	further	
confusion	for	lower	courts76.	At	this	point,	though,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	Arnold	J,	
in	his	SAS	decision,	seems	to	fully	adopt	the	harmonized	European	originality	standard,	
even	though,	later	on,	the	Court	of	Appeal,	on	the	same	case,	did	not	once	again	clarify	
the	difference	between	the	two	criteria.	 It	 is	beyond	than	clear	that	the	UK	case	 law	
remains	confused	over	the	interpretation	and	application	of	the	originality	standard	of	
the	author’s	own	intellectual	creation,	something	that	can	easily	lead	to	incorrect	deci-
sions	and	disrupt	legal	certainty	in	the	filed	of	copyright.	
The	categorization	of	the	works	and	the	prerequisite	that	the	creation	must	be	embod-
ied	 in	 a	physical	medium,	 as	 stipulated	 in	 the	Copyright,	Designs	 and	Patents	Act	of	
1988	seem	to	lose	on	importance,	too,	due	to	the	CJEU’s	case	law.	From	the	readings	
of	the	above	rulings,	it	is	understood	that	a	work	is	copyright	material	if	it	is	original.	It	
does	not	need	to	fall	within	a	specific	subject	matter	category	of	the	closed	-list	sys-
tem,	e.g.	musical,	dramatic	or	artistic,	to	be	regarded	as	a	work	and	then	to	be	deter-
mined	if	it	is	original.	British	courts	have	not	repealed	the	categorization	as	of	yet	and	
have	expressed	mainly	negative	opinions	on	such	a	perspective.	Furthermore,	this	new	
dogma	poses	the	risk	to	some	works	described	as	subcreative,	i.e.	non-original,	in	the	
																																																						
73	 See	 NLA	 v	Meltwater	 [2010]	 EWHC	 3099	 (Ch)	 par.	 72	 and	 78.	 See	 also	 NLA	 v	Meltwater	
[2011]	EWCA	Civ	890	par.	19	and	20.	
74	See	Football	Dataco	v	Britten	Pools	[2010]	EWHC	841,	par.	86-87,	91.	
75	Ibid.,	par.	41,	43.		
76	 See	 e.g.	 Forensic	 Telecommunications	 Services	 Ltd	 v	 Chief	 Constable	 of	 West	 Yorkshire	
[2011]	EWHC	2892	 (Ch),	par.	 84	and	91,	 as	well	 as,	 SAS	 Institute	v	World	Programming	 [2010]	EWHC	
1829	par.	57,64,129,207,233,249,255,258-261,263,322.	
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UK,	as	 there	 is	no	other	 legal	basis	 for	 their	protection,	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	 an	unfair	
competition	 statute	 in	 this	 state.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 short	works	 can	 be	 protected	 by	
copyright,	if	they	fulfill	the	EU	originality	requirement,	as	Infopaq	clarified,	something	
that	has	not	been	yet	common	in	UK	case	law.		
Another	 aspect	of	 the	UK’s	 copyright	 law	 that	has	been	 significantly	 affected	by	 the	
Court’s	case	law	is	the	infringement	test.	Infopaq	associated	originality	with	the	test	of	
infringement	of	 copyright	under	 the	 Infosoc	Directive’s	 ‘reproduction	of	 the	work	or	
part	of	 the	work’.	According	to	the	Court,	 if	 that	part	copied	and	reproduced	from	a	
work	 is	 itself	 the	 ’author’s	 intellectual	 creation’,	 then	 there	 is	 infringement.	 On	 the	
contrary,	UK’s	laws	have	always	examined	if	the	part	of	the	work	taken	was	‘substan-
tial’,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 included	 ‘sufficient	 skill,	 labour	 and	 judgement’	 or	 if	 it	was	
‘commercially	relevant’77.	British	courts	continue	to	not	fully	adopt	this	new	infringe-
ment	test,	by	either	sticking	to	the	old	rule	or	sporadically	implementing	the	new	one,	
depending	on	the	specifics	of	each	case78.	Taking	into	account	the	recent	political	de-
velopments	of	‘Brexit’	and	the	forthcoming	withdrawal	of	the	country	out	of	the	EU,	it	
will	be	quite	interesting	to	see	what	the	future	holds	for	copyright	law	in	this	state79.	
In	continental	countries,	the	implications	of	the	CJEU’S	case	law	have	been	much	less	
obvious.	 In	Germany,	even	before	 the	horizontal	harmonization,	works	were	already	
protected	under	copyright	law,	as	long	as	they	were	‘personal	intellectual	creations	of	
the	author’,	a	phrasing	almost	identical	to	that	used	by	the	Court.	Nevertheless,	Ger-
man	courts	have	expressed	many	deviating	views	on	the	notion	of	originality,	e.g.	the	
minimum	 degree	 of	 personal	 creativity	 and	 individuality80,	 and	 their	 interpretations	
																																																						
77	See	Derclaye,	E	2014,	“Assessing	the	impact	of	the	reception	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	Eu-
ropean	Union	case	law	on	UK	copyright	law:	what	does	the	future	hold?,	Revue	Internationale	du	Droit	
d’auteur,	2014	(240),	p.	2.	See	also,	Griffiths,	J	2013,	“Dematerialization,	Pragmatism	and	the	European	
Copyright	Revolution”,	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	33(4); Queen	Mary	School	of	Law	Legal	Studies	
Research	Paper	No.	156/2013,	C.1,	p.	14.		
78	Ibid.,	pp.	20-21.		
79	See	HM	Government,	2017,	Enforcement	and	Dispute	Resolution	-	A	Future	Partnership	Pa-
per,	p.	2,	where	it	is	stated	that:	‘’In	leaving	the	European	Union,	we	will	bring	about	an	end	to	the	direct	
jurisdiction	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU)	and	that	‘’the	UK	wants	to	respect	the	
autonomy	of	EU	law	and	UK	legal	systems	while	taking	control	of	our	own	laws’’.	
80See	Stamatoudi,	I	2016,	‘Originality	in	EU	copyright	law’,	Media	&	Communications	Law,	vol.	
49,	p.	63.	
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have	 been	 rather	 flexible,	 though,	 without	 stretching	 too	 far	 from	 the	 author-
centralized	standard	of	their	legislation,	which	has	been	noted	by	some	to	be	the	basis	
of	the	EU	standard.	Despite	the	above,	in	some	cases,	German	courts	have	bended	this	
relatively	high	originality	standard,	 following	the	doctrine	of	 ‘small	change’	or	 ‘Kleine	
Munze’	in	Germany,	according	to	which	even	some	just	average	works	of	little	creativi-
ty,	such	as	mathematical	tables,	recipe	books	and	address	books	are	also	granted	cop-
yright	protection81.		
Finally,	with	 regard	 to	Greece,	 the	 concept	 of	 originality	 is	 established,	 as	 a	 general	
prerequisite	 for	 the	protection	of	 the	subject	matter,	 in	Article	2	par.	1	of	 the	Greek	
Copyright	Law	(N.	2121/1993)	under	which:	“1.	The	term	work	shall	designate	any	orig-
inal	 intellectual	 literary,	 artistic	 or	 scientific	 creation,...”,	 while	 a	 second	 criterion	 of	
originality	 is	established	 in	par.	3	of	 the	same	article	 in	 terms	of	computer	programs	
under	which	“…A	computer	program	shall	be	protected	if	it	is	original	in	the	sense	that	
it	is	the	author’s	personal	intellectual	creation”.	Actually,	so	far,	this	remains	the	only	
explicit	reference	of	the	EU	originality	standard,	as	an	implementation	of	the	Software	
Directive	 into	 the	Greek	 law.	Since	 the	 law	does	not	define	 the	notion	of	originality,	
theory	 and	 case	 law	 attempted	 to	 shape	 it	 by	 adopting	 the	 theory	 of	 ‘’statistical	
uniqueness’’	of	the	Swiss	jurist	Kummer.	According	to	this,	a	work	is	original	only	when	
there	 is	a	high	probability	 that	no	other	author,	even	under	 the	same	circumstances	
and	with	the	same	goals,	would	be	able	to	create	a	similar	work.	As	Greek	courts	have	
at	times	ruled,	an	original	work	has	to	possess	a	minimum	of	a	‘creative	height’	and	be	
distant	from	the	already	known	or	self-evident,	which	somehow	is	reminiscent	of	the	
term	‘’free	and	creative	choices’’	that	the	Court	has	used	in	its	decisions,	as	already	de-
scribed	above82.	 This	approach	 seems	 to	put	 the	weight	on	 the	creative	 result	 itself,	
thus	it	sets	a	higher	threshold	of	protection	than	the	harmonized	EU	originality	stand-
ard	which	is	more	close	to	the	subjective	standard	of	the	continental	civil	tradition,	as	
																																																						
81	 See	Gompel,	 SV	&	 Lavik,	 2013,	 ‘Quality,	merit,	 aesthetics	 and	 purpose:	 an	 inquiry	 into	 EU	
copyright	law’s	eschewal	of	other	criteria	than	originality’,	Revue	Internationale	du	Droit	d’	Auteur	(RI-
DA);	Amsterdam	Law	School	Research	Paper	no.	2013-51;	Institute	for	Information	Law,	Research	Paper	
no.	2013-03,	p.31.	
82See	Marinos,	M	2004,	Copyright	Law,	2nd	edn,	Sakkoulas	Editions,	Athens	and	Komotini,	p.	80	
and	See	Kotsiris,	L	&	Stamatoudi,	 I	2009,	Commentary	on	the	Greek	copyright	act,	Sakkoulas	Editions,	
Athens	and	Thessaloniki,	p.	33.	
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it	puts	forward	the	‘personal	touch’	of	the	author.	Whilst,	pursuant	to	CJEU	case	law,	
the	criterion	of	statistical	uniqueness	should	be	replaced	by	 the	EU	originality	stand-
ard,	up	till	today,	eight	years	after	the	Infopaq	decision,	Greek	courts	seem	to	be	either	
unaware	 or	 even	 confused	 in	 connection	 with	 their	 interpretation	 of	 the	 European	
originality	 standard	 and	 its	 application	on	 various	 cases.	 For	 instance,	 the	Greek	 Su-
preme	Court,	in	order	to	identify	whether	a	lottery	game	was	entitled	to	copyright	pro-
tection,	examined	its	statistical	uniqueness,	disregarding	the	criterion	of	author’s	own	
intellectual	creation	and	the	CJEU’S	case	law	on	the	matter.83	Quite	surprisingly,	in	an-
other	case	on	an	audiovisual	work,	 the	Athens	Multi-member	Court	of	First	 Instance	
invoked	the	Infopaq	decision.	However,	it	does	so,	only	in	connection	to	the	protection	
of	some	parts	of	those	works,	which	may	be	possible	to	bear	originality	on	their	own.	
As	for	the	recognition	of	those	works	as	original,	and	thus,	worthy	of	copyright	protec-
tion,	 it	completely	 ignores	the	European	criterion	and	once	again	fully	adopts	that	of	
statistical	 uniqueness,	widely	 acknowledged	 by	Greek	 courts.84	 Lastly,	 the	 only	 clear	
references	of	the	European	originality	standard	in	recent	Greek	case	 law	is	restricted	
only	to	those	categories	of	works,	that	triggered	the	adoption	of	the	respective	Euro-
pean	 Directives.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 majority	 of	 these	 decisions	 are	 quite	 confusing,	
since	 they	 invoke	and	sometimes	even	apply85	 the	criterion	of	 the	statistical	unique-
ness	together	with	that	of	the	author’s	own	intellectual	creation.86	
																																																						
83	 See	 Supreme	Court	 of	Greece,	Decision	No.	 537/2010.	 See	 also	 Supreme	Court	 of	Greece,	
Decisions	No.	196/2010,	1625/2014,	1267/2015,	1051/2015,	509/2015,	Court	of	Appeal	of	Athens,	Deci-
sions	No.	1036/2011,	2724/2012,	2969/2012	and	5190/2014,	Court	of	Appeal	of	Thessaloniki,	Decision	
No.	1033/2015	and	Multi-member	Court	of	First	Instance	of	Thessaloniki,	Decision	No.	7241/2015.	
84	See	Multi-member	Court	of	First	 Instance	of	Athens,	Decision	No.	3562/2015,	under	which	
the	court	ruled	that	the	audiovisual	works	from	the	period	of	the	so	called	Regime	of	the	Colonels,	have	
all	necessary	prerequisites	to	be	originals,	since	“under	the	same	circumstances	and	with	the	same	ob-
jectives	no	other	author	would,	 in	the	ordinary	course	of	events,	create	the	same	audiovisual	works…”.	
See	also	Multi-member	Court	of	First	Instance	of	Athens,	Decision	No.	3141/2015	with	respect	to	works	
of	architecture.	
85	 See	 Multi-member	 Court	 of	 First	 Instance	 of	 Athens,	 Decision	 No.	 5821/2010	 par.	 18	 in	
which,	even	though	the	court	accepted	that	“…the	said	photographs	are	plaintiff’s	own	intellectual	crea-
tion,	which	do	not	constitute	copies	of	others	and	show	some	minimum	individuality	…”,	 it	 finally	con-
cluded	 that	 the	works	 at	 issue	are	 original,	 since	 “…	under	 the	 same	 circumstances	 and	objectives	 no	
other	author	would,	under	reasonable	probability,	be	able	to	create	the	same	photographs	…”.	See	also	
Court	of	Appeal	of	Athens,	Decision	No.	2211/2010.	
86	See	Supreme	Court	of	Greece,	Decision	No.	509/2015,	where	the	court	judged	that	the	pho-
tographic	depictions	at	 issue	contained	 in	the	writings	and	the	explanatory	texts	constituted	“…	plain-
tiff’s	personal	intellectual	contribution	with	intense	individual	peculiarity	...with	the	result	that	the	plain-
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6.	Conclusions	
Even	after	almost	25	years	of	both	vertical	and	horizontal	harmonisation	of	the	origi-
nality	standard	in	EU	copyright	law,	national	courts	of	Member	States	continue	to	in-
terpret	 its	definition	based	on	their	unique	legal	traditions	and	overall	cultures,	thus,	
leading	to	a	fragmetation	of	the	Ιnternal	Μarket	and	an	obstruction	to	the	further	de-
velopment	and	competitiveness	of	the	Union.	In	order	to	avoid	such	negative	effects,	
national	courts	shall	try	to	keep	themselves	uptodate	with	all	the	latest	developments	
in	European	copyright	law,	including	CJEU	case	law	and	so	be	able	to	apply	the	correct	
originality	criterion.	Additionally,	they	should	carefully	consider	which	legal	precedents	
can	still	apply	to	the	cases	under	examination	and	more	willingly	seek	clarifications	by	
the	CJEU,	whenever	this	is	deemed	necessary.	In	this	way,	courts,	by	issuing	clear	and	
unambiguous	decisions,	will	achieve	a	better	safeguarding	of	the	legal	certainty	in	fa-
vour	of	a	homogeneous	and	utmost	protection	of	both	authors	and	their	works.		
Furthermore,	 Copyright	 law	 has	 been	 mainly	 based	 on	 the	 shared	 competence	
between	the	EU	and	its	Member	States,	in	relation	to	the	establishment	and	the	func-
tioning	of	the	Internal	Market,	by	virtue	of	Articles	4(2)(a)	and	114	of	the	TFEU,	even	
though	it	could	be	argued	that	copyright	pertains	not	only	to	areas	such	as	trade	and	
competition	but	also	culture,	thus	the	EU	could	intervene	in	copyright	legislation	based	
on	 its	compretence	derived	from	other	 legas	bases	as	well87.	The	main	problem	with	
the	competence	of	the	EU	under	Article	114	of	the	TFEU	is	that	the	latter	has	no	nor-
mative	 capacity.	 This	 means	 that	 it	 gives	 the	 EU	 a	 more	 functional	 competence	 to	
																																																																																																																																																														
tiff	to	be	the	original	beneficiary	enjoying	the	legal	protection	of	the	moral	and	property	right	on	them..”.	
See	also	Court	of	Appeal	of	Athens,	Decision	No.	2724/2012,	Court	of	Appeal	of	Thessaloniki,	Decision	
No.	1033/2015,	Multi-member	Court	of	First	Instance	of	Athens,	Decision	No.	382/2013,	as	well	as,	Su-
preme	Court	of	Greece,	Decision	No.	1051/2015	where	the	court	 ruled	with	respect	to	digital	hunting	
maps	that	they	constitute	plaintiff’s	“own	intellectual	creation,	since	they	meet	the	requirements	of	the	
general	term	of	art.	2	(1)	of	Law	2121/1993,	that	is,	they	are	original”.	Nevertheless,	the	court	contin-
ued	by	stating	that	“it	is	judged,	in	other	words,	that	under	the	same	conditions	and	objectives,	no	other	
author,	under	reasonable	probability,	would	be	able	to	create	a	similar	work,	which	displays	a	“creative	
height”,	so	as	to	stand	out	and	differentiate	from	the	other	works	of	everyday	life	or	other	similar	known	
works,	demonstrating	at	the	same	time	something	of	the	uniqueness	of	the	personality	of	the	plaintiff,	
who	 is	 naturist…”.	 With	 regard	 to	 databases,	 see	 also	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Greece,	 Decision	 No.	
1993/2014,	as	well	as,	Multi-member	Court	of	First	Instance	of	Thessaloniki,	Decision	No.	23120/2013.	
87	See	Ramalho,	A	2014,	“Conceptualising	the	European	Union’s	competence	in	copyright:	what	
can	the	EU	do?”,	International	Review	of	Intellectual	Property	and	Competition	Law	2,	178,	p.2.	
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achieve	its	objective	of	the		in	relation	with	the	Internal	Market	but	is	not	restrictive	on	
how	 this	will	 be	accomplished.	As	 a	 result,	 the	Union	usually	 chooses	 rather	 flexible	
legal	instuments,	e.g.	Directives,recommendations	or	non-binding	guidelines,	that	lea-
ve	plenty	of	room	to	the	national	legislator	to	have	the	upper	hand	in	the	final	choice	
of	the	measures	implemented	each	time88.	
The	 Lisbon	Reform	Treaty	of	2009	has	presented	 the	perfect	opportunity	 for	 the	EU	
copyright	field	to	turn	the	page	for	good	and	at	last	move	towards	a	European	Copy-
right	Law,	a	uniform	Regulation	on	copyright,	on	the	basis	of	Article	118	of	the	TFEU,	
as	 it	has	been	proposed	by	 the	European	Copyright	Society89.	 For	 the	 first	 time,	 it	 is	
explicitly	expressed	in	the	Treaties	that	the	european	authorities	shall	act	to	 ‘provide	
uniform	protection	of	intellectual	property	rights	throughout	the	Union...’,	though	still	
in	the	context	of	the	shared	competence	with	a	view	to	the	 internal	market.90	While	
improving	the	already	existing	legal	framework,	through	further	harmonisation,	by	pe-
rhaps	 amending	 the	 existing	 Directives,	 a	 uniform	 copyright	 Regulation,	 which	 after	
the	Lisbon	Treaty	Reform	could	be	adopted	by	a	qualified	majority	and	would	not	re-
quire	unanimity,	as	in	the	past,	could	possibly	regulate	some	more	urgent	main	points,	
e.g.	the	originality	standard,	 in	a	more	homogenous	and	solid	way,	as	it	would	be	di-
rectly	applicable	within	national	legislations,	always	respecting	the	principles	of	subsi-
diarity	and	proportionality91.	Such	a	Regulation	would	help	the	EU	achieve	more	legal	
certainty	for	all	parties	affected	by	copyright	law,	which	is	mainly	shaped	by	the	CJEU	
case	law,	which	has	so	far	been	occasional,	both	in	terms	of	time	and	content,	and	si-
gnificantly	 variable	 and	 unpredictable.	 Additionally,	 it	 would	 reduce	 legal	 costs	 and	
avoid	 time-consuming	 court	 proceedings,	 in	 connection	with	 the	 implementation	 of	
																																																						
88	Ibid.,	pp.	3-4.	
89	See	European	Copyright	Society,	2014,	Unification	of	Copyright	Law.	
90	See	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	,Article	118	states	that:	‘’	In	the	context	
of	the	establishment	and	functioning	of	the	internal	market,	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council,	
acting	in	accordance	with	the	ordinary	legislative	procedure,	shall	establish	measures	for	the	creation	of	
European	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 to	 provide	 uniform	 protection	 of	 intellectual	 property	 rights	
throughout	the	Union	and	for	the	setting	up	of	centralised	Union-wide	authorization	coordination	and	
supervision	arrangements’’.	
91	See	Eechoud,	MV,	Hugenholtz,	PB,	Gompel,	SV,	Guibault,	L	&	Helberger,	N	2009,	Harmonizing	
european	 copyright	 law:	 the	 challenges	 of	 better	 lawmaking,	 vol.	 19,	 Kluwer	 Law	 International,	 The	
Netherlands,	pp.	19-26.	
	
  -37- 
the	EU	Directives	by	Member	States	and	 increase	 transparency.	Moreover	and	more	
importantly,	 it	 would	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 territoriality	 of	 copyright	 rights	which	 in	
turn	entails	extra	transaction	and	licensing	costs,	poses	risks	to	the	free	movement	of	
services	 and	 undermines	 the	 dynamic	 of	 the	 EU	 to	 become	 a	 world	 pioneer	 and	 a	
norm-setter	 in	the	field	of	copyright	 law,	with	all	 the	positive	consequences	that	this	
would	 generate	 for	 both	 its	 economy	 and	 people.	 The	 European	 political	 and	 legal	
elites	should	soon	agree	upon	the	next	steps	which	will	for	good	unify	or	at	least	deep-
ly	harmonize	the	EU	copyright	law,	and	thus,	modernize	it	and	keep	it	up	to	date	with	
the	standards	of	the	always	shifting	global	digital	and	information	economy.	
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